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Abstract
In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimal
contracts, which we call \fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.
The two main axioms we employ are incentive e±ciency and no{envyness. The
incentive e±ciency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto e±cient
contracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No{envyness is
equity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of others
in the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension between
incentive e±ciency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple feature
that risk averse agents are o®ered the ¯xed wage to choose only the least costly
action.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the moral hazard model in which agents choose unob-
servable actions and provide an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimal con-
tracts, which we call \fair contracts," in the view point of both e±ciency and equity.
The standard approach to the moral hazard problem (for example see Grossman and
Hart (1983), Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988)) has focused only on the e±ciency in
the sense that the principal chooses a contract to maximize her expected payo® sub-
ject to the set of constraints as follows. (i) incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
contract must give the agent the proper incentive to choose a right action because
his action is not observable. (ii) individual rationality (IR) constraint: contract
should give the agent at least the reservation utility. (iii) Budget balanced (BB):
total incomes of both parties sum up to the realized total revenue. We then say
that a contract satis¯es incentive e±ciency (IE) if it satis¯es (IC), (BB) and there
exist no other Pareto improving contracts which satisfy (IC), (BB). In the standard
principal-agent model a contract is selected in favor of the principal from all (IE)
contracts by satisfying (IR) of the agent.
We provide a slightly di®erent approach to address the optimal contract design
problem in the moral hazard models. We impose several axioms which must be taken
into account when designing contracts to agents in organization and then charac-
terize the contracts satisfying these axioms. The axioms we will employ include not
only the standard e±ciency criterion such as (IE) mentioned above but also a sort
of equity concern among agents, which we will call no-envyness (NE). Here (NE)
requires that each agent does not envy any contracts o®ered to others within the
same organization. This is analogous to the concept of \no-envyness" used in the
literature of social choice theory (see Thosmson (2010) for a comprehensive survey
on this topic): a resource allocation is said be no-envy if every individual does not
envy the consumption bundles allocated to others.1 We will modify this idea in the
context of the principal-agent model and utilize it as an equity condition in order
to characterize the optimal contracts.
In addition to (IE), (IR) and (NE), we also consider the possibility that the wage
scheme of each agent is non-decreasing in his own veri¯able performance (output).
We call this axiom monotonicity (MON). This is also a reasonable requirement
because most wage schemes used in practice satisfy this condition. We can also give
theoretical justi¯cation for this condition by considering ex post moral hazard of
agents as follows. Each agent can secretly dispose his own output ex post after it
is realized. Then, if his wage is decreasing in some parts of his outputs, the agent
has the incentive to discard some amount of the realized output and obtain higher
wages. Thus (MON) must be satis¯ed for ruling out such ex post moral hazard (see
Innes (1990) and Matthews (2001) for a similar argument).
We call a contract pro¯le of agents in organization fair contract when it satis¯es
1See also Foley (1967), Pazner and Schmeidler (1974, 1978) and Varian (1974) for the classic
works on equity in economics.
2
all these axioms (IE), (NE), (MON) and (IR).2 Then we show that fair contracts
have the very simple feature as follows: every risk averse agent is o®ered a ¯xed wage
so that he chooses the least costly action. On the other hand, risk neutral agents are
motivated to choose the actions which maximize the surplus of organization, given all
risk averse agents choose the least costly action. Hence the optimal contracts (\fair
contracts" in our notion) become drastically simple once we take into account not
only the incentive e±ciency but also non-envyness for contracting in organizations.
The basic intuition behind our characterization result is the following: since risk
averse agents are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their abilities for
performing tasks, they must be o®ered di®erent wage schemes which di®er in the
degrees of how much their wages re°ect their veri¯able performances. If a wage
scheme responds more highly to the changes of the performances than another, it
is said to be higher-powered incentive scheme than the other. Put di®erently, a
higher-powered incentive scheme has \steeper slope" of reward with respect to the
performances than a lower-powered scheme. Of course, higher-powered incentive
scheme involves more risk on risk averse agent than lower-powered one. Then con-
sider a fair contract which induces risk averse agents with di®erent abilities to work
hard. High ability agents can improve the probability distributions of their per-
formances at lower marginal action costs than the low abilities. Thus, less risk is
needed for the high ability agents to work as hard as the low abilities. Then, in
the view point of incentive e±ciency the high ability agents should be o®ered lower
powered incentive scheme than the low abilities because the former can work as hard
as the latter at smaller risk. However, then the high ability agents envy the higher-
powered incentive scheme o®ered to the low ability agents because the former can
exploit their (high) ability under the wage scheme which more highly responds to
the veri¯able performances. When facing such con°ict between incentive e±ciency
and no-envyness, the organization ¯nds it impossible to have risk averse agents with
di®erent abilities work hard together. As a consequence, any fair contract must
involve a ¯xed wage for di®erent risk averse agents who are induced to choose only
the least costly action.
Our model has the relative advantage to the standard moral hazard models in
that we can provide a simple characterization result even in general production
environment. In the standard approach to the moral hazard problem, it is quite
di±cult to give sharp predictions about exact features of optimal contracts: how do
optimal wages vary with veri¯able performances? What shapes does the optimal
wage schedule display? Is it linear or non-linear? In contrast our result shows that
the optimal contracts become drastically simple once we take into account not only
e±ciency but also some sort of equity among agents in organization.
Beside the theoretical interest, it is also important to extend the standard
2This is also analogous to the concept of \fair allocation" used in the literature of social choice
theory. An allocation is said to be fair if it satis¯es Pareto e±ciency and no-envyness (Thomson
(2010)). In our context the Pareto e±ciency is replaced by incentive e±ciency (IE) due to the
presence of the moral hazard problem.
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principal-agent models to encompass some notions of equity or fairness. This is
because in real world there are organizations which may seek di®erent objectives
from maximizing the principal's pro¯t, e.g., non-pro¯t organizations, governments,
and state{owned enterprises. These organizations may take into account the welfare
of employees, citizens and so on, and may pursue not only e±ciency but also some
kinds of fairness, e.g., governments would try to design \fair" tax systems. Even in
pro¯t organizations equity is often one of the major concerns as well as e±ciency
and pro¯tability. For example, top management of corporations might try to avoid
con°ict among employees who are concerned about their relative wages in the same
workplaces.
Related Literature
There are two strands of the literature which are related to our paper. First, several
recent papers incorporate the aspects of fairness into the standard principal-agent
models.3 However, in these papers equity concern and other-regarding preferences
are directly introduced into the payo® functions of agents in some speci¯c ways: for
example, the payo® function of an agent is assumed to depend on relative incomes
between him and his colleagues. Our approach is di®erent from these papers because
we do not impose direct speci¯cations of fairness concern on the payo® functions of
agents but rather we use an axiomatic approach by using (NE) as a natural axiom.
Thus our model can avoid the problem regarding what speci¯cation of the payo®
function is the most plausible to describe the preference over equity and fairness.
Second, some papers show the optimality of simple contracts in the moral hazard
environments. HolmstrÄom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal reward to
agent becomes linear with respect to the eventual outcomes in the dynamic model
in which agent controls the drift rate of the stochastic process of outputs (see also
Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) for further elaboration of the model). Our paper is
di®erent from theirs because we focus on the standard static moral hazard environ-
ment only except for incorporating the concept of no-envyness as an equity concern.
HolmstrÄom and Milgrom (1994) also show that the optimal contract to agent be-
comes ¯xed wage in the multi-task context in which agent performs multiple tasks
at a time. Although our model also shows the optimality of the ¯xed wage as in
theirs, our approach is di®erent from theirs again because we investigate the tension
between incentive e±ciency and no-envyness, which results in the lower-powered
incentive schemes.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: in Section 2 we set up the basic
model of moral hazard in an organization with multiple agents. In Section 3 we
provide a characterization result that the optimal contracts which satisfy incentive
e±ciency and no{envyness become the ¯xed wage scheme for all risk averse agents
3See for example Bartling (2010), Englmaier and Wamback (2010), Fehr and Schmidt (2000,
2004), Itoh (2004), Neilson and Stone (2010) and Rey-Biel (2008) for recent development of agency
models incorporating inequity aversion.
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when we impose some technical conditions on the probability distributions of the
veri¯able performances. In Section 4 we will show more general characterization
result without imposing the speci¯c conditions on the information structure, given
the heterogeneity among risk averse agents is su±ciently small. In Section 5 we
will proceed to show the existence proof of fair contract. Our proof is constructive.
We ¯nd a fair contract which satis¯es all the axioms we have mentioned, (IE),
(NE), (MON) and (IR), under certain conditions. In Section 6 we will discuss the
robustness and extensions of our results: ¯rst, we show that our characterization
results are not substantially changed by dropping the axiom of monotonicity (MON).
Second, we will discuss the implications about the priority of e±ciency and equity
for designing incentive contracts. Our concept of fair contracts is interpreted as the
one we are capturing the situation in which agents of organization ¯rst seek the
incentive e±ciency and then, as the second step, they select the contracts which
satisfy no-envyness as well as other axioms. We will call such contracts e±ciency{
¯rst{optimal contracts. One might however think that in some organizations equity
may be taken as the ¯rst priority before considering the incentive e±ciency. This
might be suitable in non{pro¯t organizations and public sectors. In such situations
agents of organization ¯rst identify the set of no{envy contracts and then, as the
second step, they select the Pareto e±cient contracts among all possible no-envy
contracts together with other axioms. We will call such contracts equity-¯rst-optimal
contracts. We then show that the set of equity{¯rst-optimal contracts is not smaller
than the set of e±ciency{¯rst{optimal contracts. This result implies that there may
exist the possibilities that high{powered incentive contracts are o®ered to risk averse
agents even when heterogeneity among agents is so small that all e±ciency{¯rst{
optimal contracts must have the ¯xed wage schemes of risk averse agents. Thus
incentive schemes o®ered in organizations which take equity as the ¯rst priority are
more likely to be higher powered than those in organizations which take e±ciency
as the ¯rst priority.
2 Model
We consider an organization (or a team) which consists of N agents. Let I be the set
of all agents where #I = N . Let Ir be the set of risk averse agents where Nr = #Ir
and In the set of risk neutral agents where Nn = #In. Thus I = Ir [ In. We
assume that there exist at least two risk averse agents and one risk neutral agent in
organization:
Assumption 1. Nr ¸ 2 and Nn ¸ 1.
Agent i chooses an unobservable action ai 2 A where A is ¯nite and #A =
M + 1 ¸ 2. We denote by an 2 A a generic element of A where a0 ´ 0 · a1 · a2 ·
¢ ¢ ¢ · aM . Let a ´ (a1; a2; :::; aN ) be a vector of actions taken by all agents.
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Agent i generates a veri¯able performance yi 2 Y . We can interpret yi as output
of agent i which is used to yield the revenue of organization as we will explain more
below. We assume that Y is a ¯nite set and #Y = L ¸ 2. Let yin be a generic
element of Y . We denote by P in(a) 2 (0; 1) the probability of the performance yin of
agent i being realized conditional on his action a 2 A. Let y ´ (y1; y2; :::; yN ) be a
vector of the realized performances of all agents. We assume that the performances
y are independently distributed among agents.
Agents are heterogeneous in terms of their abilities for performing the tasks as-
signed to them. Speci¯cally, agents di®er from each other in terms of the probability
distributions of their performances (P in(a
i))Ln=1 and their action costs Gi(a). Agent
i has the following standard utility function which is separable between utility on
income w and disutility on action a 2 A:
ui(w)¡Gi(a) (1)
where Gi is increasing and we normalize Gi(0) = 0. Here we assume that the utility
functions on incomes are identical across all risk averse agents. Thus we set ui = u
for all i 2 Ir. Let Á ´ u¡1 be the inverse function of u. We also suppose that the
utility function on income of risk neutral agent is given by ui(w) = w for each i 2 In.
Remark. We can allow all A, Y and u to depend on identities of agents. However,
our main results are not substantially changed as long as the di®erences in these
characteristics are small.
The organization can generate the total revenue R(y) which depends on a pro¯le
of performances (outputs) of agents y. R is increasing in each argument. In what
follows we will use notations as follows: let Ey[¢ja] be expectation over the perfor-
mances of all agents y 2 Y N conditional on an action pro¯le of them a. Let Eyi [¢jai]
be expectation over the veri¯able performance yi of agent i conditional on his action
ai. Let also Ey¡i [¢ja¡i] denote expectation over the veri¯able performances of all
other agents than i conditional on their actions a¡i = (aj)j 6=i.
Since the performances (or outputs) of agent y are veri¯able but their actions a
are not, a wage scheme of agent i should be contingent only on the realizations of y.
A contract of agent i is de¯ned by Ci = fwi(y); a^ig which speci¯es wi(y) the wage
scheme depending on realization of veri¯able performances y and an action a^i 2 A
to be taken. Let C = (Ci)i2I be a pro¯le of contracts. We call a wage scheme wi(y)
¯xed wage when
wi(y) = w
for some constant w for all y 2 Y N .
We suppose that the wage schemes fwi(y)gi2I must be budget balanced ex post,
i.e. the total wages of all agents should be equal to the organization revenue, as
follows: X
i2I
wi(y) = R(y) 8 y 2 Y N : (BB)
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We denote by C the set of all contracts satisfying (BB). We will restrict our attention
to the class of the wage schemes in C in what follows.
Next we will consider several axioms to be satis¯ed in organization.
First, we de¯ne the e±ciency concept in the presence of the moral hazard prob-
lem. One reasonable notion of e±ciency is incentive e±ciency (IE) which is de¯ned
as the Pareto e±cient contracts satisfying incentive compatibility (IC) of agents.
(IC) requires the following: since actions of agents are not observable, a contract
pro¯le C 2 C should give them the proper incentives to choose speci¯ed actions
a^ = (a^i)i2I . In other words a contract pro¯le C 2 C should require that every agent
follows the instruction to choose speci¯ed action a^i given all others doing so:
Ey[ui(wi(y))ja^i; a^¡i]¡Gi(a^i) ¸ Ey[ui(wi(y))ja0; a^¡i]¡Gi(a0) 8 a0 6= ai: (IC)
Here agents simultaneously choose their actions and hence each of them takes the
actions of others as given when he chooses his action because, by assumption, agents
cannot observe their actions each other. Thus an action pro¯le a^ should be a Nash
equilibrium in the game in which agents simultaneously choose their actions.
We call a contract pro¯le C 2 C incentive feasible if it satis¯es (IC). We denote
by CF ½ C the set of all incentive feasible contracts.
Although there are several ways to de¯ne the e±ciency in the presence of private
information, we follow the argument by HolmstrÄom and Myerson (1983) and de¯ne
the e±ciency on the ground of contract satisfying (IC). More formally, take an
incentive feasible contract C 2 CF and de¯ne the resulting expected utility of agent
i as
U i(Ci) ´
X
n
Ey[ui(wi(y))ja^]¡Gi(ai): (2)
Then, our ¯rst axiom is incentive e±ciency (IE) as follows:
Incentive E±ciency (IE): An incentive feasible contract C 2 CF is incentive
e±cient if there exist no other incentive feasible contract C 0 2 CF with C 0 6= C
such that U i(Ci
0
) ¸ U i(Ci) for all i 2 I with strict inequality being held for at least
one agent.
In the standard principal-agent model it has been assumed that one party, say
the principal, chooses her optimal contract among all (IE) contracts given the agent
receives at least the reservation utility. In other words the optimal contract is
selected in favor of the principal on the Pareto frontier constrained by (IC). In this
paper we do not make any restrictions on bargaining powers of agents in organization
but simply we require that a contract must be incentive e±cient.
In addition to (IE), we impose an axiom representing a sort of equity requirement,
which we call no{envyness (NE), as follows:
Ey[ui(wi(y))ja^i; a^¡i]¡Gi(a^i) ¸ max
a02A
Ey[ui(wj(y))ja0; a^¡i]¡Gi(a0) 8 j 6= i; a0 2 A:
(NE)
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(NE) states that each agent i does not envy the wage scheme of others wj(y) com-
pared to his own scheme wi(y). If agent i were o®ered the wage scheme of agent
j, he imagines that he could receive the expected utility corresponding to the right
hand side of (NE) given he will choose his action a0 2 A appropriately and all others
choose the speci¯ed actions a^¡i. (NE) then requires that agent i does not envy the
contract o®ered to others.
Note that (NE) is analogous to the concept of no-envyness used in the literature
of social choice theory (Thomson (2010)). In our model each agent imagines what
would happen if he were o®ered a contract of other agent before he chooses his
action. In this sense our notion of no-envyness is imposed at the ex ante stage
before agents choose actions. However, an alternative condition for no-envyness is
also possible. For example, some agent may envy others after they chose actions
and the ¯nal performances were realized. We will discuss this ex post case in the
concluding remarks later.
We also impose individual rationality (IR) as an axiom to be satis¯ed. We denote
by U i the reservation utility of agent i who would receive outside the organization
if he rejected the contract Ci and left the organization. Then a contract Ci should
give agent i at least the reservation utility U i, i.e. it should be individually rational
(IR):
Ey[ui(wi(y))ja^]¡Gi(a^i) ¸ U i 8 i 2 I: (IR)
Finally, we impose monotonicity (MON) that the wage scheme of each agent is
non-decreasing in his own veri¯able performance (output). This is stated formally
as follows. For all i 2 I,
wi(yi
00
; y¡i) ¸ wi(yi0 ; y¡i) 8 yi00 > yi0 ; 8 y¡i (MON)
Many contracts used in practice satisfy such monotonicity and hence this is a rea-
sonable condition. As in Innes (1990) and Matthews (2001), we can also give a
theoretical justi¯cation for this as well: each agent can secretly dispose his output
yi before he provides it to the organization.4 Then, if wi(y00; y¡i) < wi(y0; y¡i) for
some y00 > y0, agent i will dispose y00 ¡ y0 > 0 and obtain higher wage wi(y0; y¡i)
even when y00 is realized. Thus wi must be non-decreasing in yi.
Remark. We will discuss below that we can dispense with (MON) (see Section 6).
We call a contract pro¯le C = (Ci)i2I 2 C fair contract if it satis¯es all the above
axioms (IE), (NE), (IR) and (MON). Let Cf denote the set of all fair contracts. It
may be the case that Cf = ;.
4We assume here that the supplied output after the decision to dispose was made is veri¯able
but it is not veri¯able what outputs each agent actually produced before the decision to dispose is
made.
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3 Characterization of Fair Contracts
In this section we will characterize the fair contracts. To obtain sharper characteri-
zation result, we modify the notion of incentive e±ciency slightly as follows:
Modi¯ed Incentive E±ciency (IE¤): Let ~CF ½ C be the set of all contracts
satisfying (IC) and (MON). Then a contract pro¯le C 2 ~CF is said to be modi¯ed
incentive e±cient, denoted by (IE¤), if there exist no other contarcts C 0 2 ~CF with
C 0 6= C such that U i(Ci0) ¸ U i(Ci) for all i 2 I with strict inequality being held for
at least one agent.
Let Cf¤ denote the set of all contracts satisfying (IE¤), (NE) and (IR).
Then we can verify that Cf µ Cf¤ .
Lemma 1. Cf µ Cf¤ .
Proof. Take C 2 Cf but suppose that C =2 Cf¤ . Then, since C satis¯es (NE) and
(IR) but C =2 Cf¤ , C must not satisfy (IE¤). Since C satis¯es (IC) and (MON),
we have C 2 ~CF . Then, since C is not modi¯ed incentive e±cient, there must
exist a di®erent contract C 0 6= C where C 0 2 ~CF such that C 0 Pareto dominates C.
However, since C 0 2 ~CF implies that C 0 satis¯es (IC), we must have C 0 2 CF . Then,
C 0 is incentive feasible and Pareto dominates C but this contradicts the fact that C
is incentive e±cient. Q.E.D.
In this section we will focus on the set Cf¤ which is larger than Cf . Then we
will give a characterization result on Cf¤ which is sharper than the characterization
result on the set Cf . With a slight abuse of de¯nition, we call C 2 ~CF fair contract
in the same way as de¯ned in the previous section. Then we will show that all
fair contracts C 2 ~CF must involve ¯xed wages o®ered to risk averse agents under
certain conditions. Then Lemma 1 implies that all contracts in Cf must also have
¯xed wages o®ered to risk averse agents.
We take any fair contract C^ 2 Cf¤ where C^i = fwi(y); a^ig for each i 2 I and ¯x
it in this section.
We ¯rst show the following result:
Lemma 2. Any fair contract C^i o®ered to risk averse agent i 2 Ir who is induced to
choose a higher action a^i > 0 than the least costly one (zero) must be individualistic
in the sense that w^i(y) = w^i(yi) for all i 2 Ir.
Proof. Appendix.
Since the performance signals are statistically independent among agents, it is
e±cient for wage scheme of every risk averse agent to depend solely on his own
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performances. If this is not the case for some risk averse agent, it is possible to
design the new wage scheme of that agent such that it induces the same expected
utility and the same action as under the original scheme while reducing the risk
imposed on him by eliminating the dependence of all other agents' performances
from his wage scheme. Then some risk neutral agents are better o® by reducing the
risk on the risk averse agents while unchanging their incentives. Thus (IE¤) requires
that the wage scheme of every risk averse agent must be individualistic.
Due to Lemma 2 we will denote by wi(yi) the wage scheme o®ered to risk averse
agent i, which solely depends on his own performance yi = yn 2 Y .
Next we consider the following implementation problem where the expected wage
of risk averse agent j 2 Ir is minimized when implementing an action a 2 A from
him:
Problem (CMj ¡ a)
min
w(yn)
X
n
P jn(a)w(yn)
subject to
w(y00) ¸ w(y0) 8 y00 > y0 (MON)X
n
P jn(a)u(w(yn))¡Gj(a) ¸
X
n
P jn(a
0)u(w(yn))¡Gj(a0); 8 a0 6= a (IC)
X
n
P jn(a)u(w(yn)¡Gj(a) ¸ U^ j (IR¤)
where
U^ j ´
X
n
P jn(a)u(w^
j(yn))¡Gj(a^j)
denotes the expected payo® of agent i under the supposed fair contract C^j .
Let w^j(yja) be the wage scheme which solves the above problem (CMj ¡ a) to
implement a 2 A from risk averse agent j. Let a = a^j in Problem (CMj ¡ a). Then
the optimal wage scheme w^j(yja) which solves Problem (CMj ¡ a^j) exists because
the fair contract C^j satis¯es all (MON), (IC) and (IR¤) by de¯nition and hence the
constraint set is non-empty.5 Also the optimal scheme w^j(yja) is unique.6
Since a contract C^i must be incentive e±cient, it must solve Problem (CMi ¡
a^i) for each risk averse agent i 2 Ir. Otherwise there exists a di®erent contract
5By a standard argument (Grossman and Hart (1983)), we can verify that the constraint set is
compact as well. Then the existence of the optimal wage scheme directly follows from the continuity
of the objective function.
6To see the uniqueness, de¯ne wn ´ Á(un) for each yn 2 Y and note that (IC) and (IR¤) are
both linear constraints with respect to (un). Thus the constraint set, denoted by ¡, is convex: take
any (u0n)n and (u
00
n)n in ¡, and ¸u
0
n+(1¡¸)u00n for ¸ 2 (0; 1). Then we can verify that Á(¸u0n+(1¡
¸)u00n)¡Á(¸u0n¡1+(1¡¸)u00n¡1) ¸ Á0(¸u0n¡1+(1¡¸)u00n¡1)(¸(u0n¡u0n¡1)+(1¡¸)(u00n¡u00n¡1)) ¸ 0
due to convexity of Á and (u0n); (u
00
n) 2 ¡ so that they satisfy (MON). Thus ¸u0n + (1 ¡ ¸)u00n 2 ¡
and hence ¡ is convex.
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Ci 6= C^i which satis¯es (MON), (IC) and (IR¤) for agent i but yields a smaller
expected wage than the minimum attained in Problem (CMi¡ a^i). By replacing C^i
by such alternative contract Ci, some risk neutral agent can be better o® because the
organization can save the wage payment to the risk averse agent and gives some risk
neutral agent such saved amount while still implementing the same action pro¯le.
This is formally shown as in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose that C^i = fw^i(yi); a^ig is a fair contract of risk averse agent
i 2 Ir. Then C^i should solve Problem (CMi¡ a^i) to implement a^i from agent i, i.e.,
w^i(y) = w^i(yja^i) for each y 2 Y and for each risk averse agent i 2 Ir.
Proof. Appendix.
From now on, we assume that risk averse agents are heterogeneous in decreasing
order in terms of their abilities. To this end, we introduce some notation as follows:
let ¢Gi(a^; a) ´ Gi(a^)¡Gi(a) > 0 be the marginal action cost of agent i for a^ > a.
Let F in(a) be the distribution function of agent i's performance conditional on his
action a 2 A, de¯ned by F in(a) ´
P
l·n P
i
l (a).
Then we impose the following weak condition:
Assumption 2. (i) For any i 2 Ir and any a^ > a, we have F in(a) > F in(a^) for any
n · L¡ 1. (ii) For any i 6= j, i; j 2 Ir, and any a 2 A, F in(a) > F jn(a) holds for all
yn 2 Y when i > j.
Assumption 2 (i) simply states that higher action can improve the probability
distribution of performances for any risk averse agent in the sense of the ¯rst order
stochastic dominance. Assumption 2 (ii) says that the risk averse agent indexed by
lower number j can improve the probability distribution of the performances in the
sense of the ¯rst order stochastic dominance than the risk averse agent indexed by
higher number i > j.
In addition to Assumption 2 we impose further restrictions on the ability ranking
among di®erent risk averse agents. We de¯ne the following: for any two risk averse
agents k = i; j 2 Ir, i 6= j, and any two actions a^ 6= a,
¸kn(a^; aji; j) ´
F in(a)¡ F jn(a^)
F kn (a)¡ F kn (a^)
(3)
and
¸
k(a^; aji; j) ´ max
n
¸kn(a^; aji; j);
¸k(a^; aji; j) ´ min
n
¸kn(a^; aji; j):
Here note that ¸kn(a^; aji; j) is well-de¯ned due to Assumption 2.
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To see what ¸kn(a^; aji; j) says about, suppose that risk averse agent i chooses
an action a 2 A and, as a thought experiment, imagine that his type is changed
from i to j as well as his action is also changed from a to a^. Then the distribution
function of the performance yi is changed from F in(a) to F
j
n(a^). Such total change
F jn(a^)¡ F in(a) can be decomposed into either
F in(a)¡ F jn(a^) = (F in(a)¡ F in(a^)) + (F in(a^)¡ F jn(a^)) (4)
or
F in(a)¡ F jn(a^) = (F in(a)¡ F jn(a)) + (F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^)): (5)
Such decomposition is made along with two di®erent roots: ¯rst, type is changed
from i to j by ¯xing an action. Second, action is changed from a to a^ by ¯xing a
type. In this respect ¸kn(a^; aji; j) can be interpreted as the inverse measure about
how much the change in agent k's action (a ! a^) contributes to the total change
of F in(a)¡ F jn(a^) relative to the change of types (i! j). Then 1=¸k(a^; aji; j) (resp.
1=¸k(a^; aji; j)) represents the maximum (resp. minimum) in°uence of such relative
contribution of agent k's action to the total change F in(a)¡ F jn(a^).
Then we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. For any two risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir and any action a^ > a, if
i > j, then
¢Gi(a^; a)
¢Gj(a^; a)
>
¸
j(a^; aji; j)
¸i(a^; aji; j) :
The left hand side of the inequality in Assumption 3 is the marginal action cost
of agent i relative to agent j. Its right hand side is the ratio between the maximal
in°uence of the relative contribution by agent i's action and the minimal in°uence
of the relative contribution by agent j's action as we have de¯ned above. Thus the
right hand side represents the upper bound for the relative contribution of agent
i's action as compared to agent j. Then Assumption 3 says that agent i incurs
larger marginal action cost than agent j even when he performs his task at the best
compared to agent j. In this sense we can say that agent i is less e±cient than agent
j.
Given all these assumptions, by recalling that #Ir = Nr and #A = M + 1, we
can show the following result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1-3 hold. Suppose also that M + 1 · Nr.
Then any fair contract must have a ¯xed wage for at least Nr¡M risk averse agents.
Proof. Appendix.
12
Theorem 1 states that o®ering a ¯xed wage to risk averse agents becomes preva-
lent feature in large organizations in which the number of risk averse agents is so
large relative to the number of actions each agent can take.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows. Since the number of actionsM+1
is larger than the number of risk averse agents Nr (M + 1 ¸ Nr), if only less than
Nr ¡M risk averse agents choose the least costly action, there must be at least two
risk averse agents who choose the same action a^ > 0. Let these agents be i and
j. Then, by Assumption 3 we can label them as i > j without loss of generality.
Here agent i is less e±cient than j in the sense of Assumption 3. Then we can
show that, when both i and j choose the same and higher action than the least
costly one, (IC) of more e±cient agent (agent j) must be slack: the wage scheme
of less e±cient agent i must be higher-powered than that of more e±cient agent
j when implementing the same action a^ > 0 from both agents. However, agent j
then envies agent i since the former can exploit more gains of higher ability from
higher-powered scheme than the latter. Thus no-envyness and incentive e±ciency
cannot be compatible with each other. Therefore, fair contract must involve a ¯xed
wage for at least Nr ¡M risk averse agents.
When the number of veri¯able performances yi 2 Y is two (#Y = 2), As-
sumption 3 is greatly simpli¯ed as follows. When #Y = 2, we have y = y1 (low
outcome) or y = y2 (high outcome). Then Assumption 3 is satis¯ed as long as
¢Gi(a^; a)=¢Gj(a^; a) > (P i2(a^)¡P i2(a))=(P j2 (a^)¡P j2 (a)) for all a^ > a because then we
have ¸k(a^; a) = ¸k(a^; a) = (F i1(a)¡F j1 (a^))=(F k1 (a)¡F k1 (a^)) and F k1 (a) = 1¡P k2 (a).
Here P k2 (a^)¡ P k2 (a) denotes the marginal increase in success probability of obtain-
ing high outcome y2 from exerting higher action a^ > a. Thus this condition simply
states that the marginal action cost of agent i relative to that of agent j is larger
than the marginal increase in success probability of agent i relative to that of agent
j.
4 More General Characterization: Small Heterogeneity
We will next consider an alternative condition to dispense with both Nr ¸ M + 1
and Assumption 3. In particular, we will show that the same characterization result
as Theorem 1 holds even when we drop Nr ¸ M + 1 and Assumption 2 if, instead,
we assume that heterogeneity among risk averse agents is su±ciently small.
We ¯rst de¯ne the marginal expected revenue of organization with respect to
action of agent i, given action of agent j, aj , and the actions of all others, denoted
by a¡i¡j ´ (ak)k 6=i;j , as follows:
¢i(aj jai00 ; ai0) ´ Ey[R(y)jai00 ; aj ; a¡i¡j ]¡ Ey[R(y)jai0 ; aj ; a¡i¡j ]:
Since A and Ir are ¯nite, there exists some scalar ® > 0 such that
j¢i(zjz00; z0)¡¢j(zjz00; z0)j · ®
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for all z; z00; z 2 A and all i; j 2 Ir.
Then we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. For any two risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir, i 6= j, and ® de¯ned
above, (i) there exists some ~¯ > 0 such that
¢i(z00jz00; z0)¡¢i(z0jz00; z0) ¸ ~¯
for all z00 > z0 and (ii) ¯ ´ ~¯¡ ® > 0
The ¯rst part of Assumption 4 says that the marginal expected revenue of orga-
nization with respect to action of each risk averse agent is increasing in actions of
others. Put di®erently, actions of agents are complement (supermodular) with each
other. The second part of Assumption 4 then means that such complementarity
gain ~¯ outweighs the asymmetry ® among risk averse agents.
We also weaken Assumption 3 as follows:
Assumption 5. For any two risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir, if i > j, then
¢Gi(a^; a) > ¢Gj(a^; a)
for all a^ > a.
Assumption 5 simply states that risk averse agents are ranked in decreasing order
in terms of only their marginal action costs.
Since A and I are ¯nite, there exists some ("; ±) > 0 such that
± ¸
¯¯¯
¢Gj(a00; a0)¡¢Gi(a00; a0)
¯¯¯
(6)
for all i; j 2 Ir and all a00; a0 2 A, and
" ¸
¯¯¯
P in(a)¡ P jn(a)
¯¯¯
(7)
for all i; j 2 Ir, all yn 2 Y and all a 2 A.
Then we can show the following result:
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1, 4 and 5 hold. Then there exists some non{
empty set D ½ <2+ such that for all ("; ±) 2 D any fair contract C^ must have ¯xed
wages for all risk averse agents who are induced to choose the least costly actions
ai = 0 for all i 2 Ir.
Proof. Appendix.
Note that Theorem 2 states that all risk averse agents are o®ered ¯xed wages in
any fair contract when heterogeneity among them are su±ciently small in the sense
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that " and ± de¯ned in (6) and (7) are both small enough. Thus we can dispense
with Assumption 2 and 3 and M +1 ¸ Nr which were used for proving Theorem 1.
The reason for this is as follows.
First, when heterogeneity among risk averse agents is small, any fair contract
must have the feature that the wage schemes of risk averse agents which implement
actions (a^i)i2Ir become close to each other. More formally, recall Lemma 3 that
the fair contract w^i(y) for risk averse agent i must solve Problem (CMi ¡ a^i): let
w^i(yija^i) be the optimal wage scheme which implements action a^i from risk averse
agent i in Problem (CMi ¡ a^i). Here we must have w^i(y) = w^i(yja^i). Then we
show that w^i(yja^) becomes close to w^j(yja^) for any y 2 Y when their heterogeneity
is small enough (both " and ± are small), provided agent i and j choose the same
action a^ 2 A.
Second, we show that all risk averse agents are actually induced to choose the
same action at any fair contract if the heterogeneity is small enough. This follows
from (IE¤) and Assumption 4. By making use of the complementarity condition in
Assumption 4, we can obtain the result that the actions of risk averse agents which
satisfy (IE¤) must be symmetric. To see this, let the organizational residual surplus
de¯ne by the expected total revenue Ey[R(y)ja] minus the total wages of all risk
averse agents
P
i2Ir Eyi [w^
i(yi)jai]:
H(a) ´ Ey[R(y)ja]¡
X
i2Ir
Eyi [w^
i(yi)ja^i]:
This should be shared among all risk neutral agents due to (BB). Then (IE¤) requires
that the actions of risk averse agents (ai)i2Ir must maximize H(a) because otherwise
other actions can be implemented from risk averse agents and hence risk neutral
agents can be better o®, which contradicts (IE¤). We then show that, if Assumption
4 holds, such optimal action becomes symmetric among all risk averse agents in the
sense that ai = aj for all i; j 2 Ir.7 Thus we can ensure that all risk averse agents
choose the same action a^i = a^j in any fair contract when the heterogeneity among
them is su±ciently small, given Assumption 4.
Third, we can show that Assumption 3 is satis¯ed when risk averse agents are
heterogeneous but such heterogeneity is larger for the di®erences in their marginal
action costs than the di®erences in the impacts of their actions on the probability
distributions of performances. In other words both " and ± are small enough but ±
is larger than ".
By combining all these facts, we can ensure Assumption 3 as well as the condition
that all risk averse agents choose the same action a^i = a^j for all i; j 2 Ir when the
heterogeneity among risk averse agents lies in some small range. Then, by using
7Without Assumption 4, the optimal actions which maximize H over (ai)i2Ir may be asymmetric
even when the expected revenue function Ey[R(y)ja] is symmetric with respect to (ai)i2Ir and w^i(¢j¢)
is also symmetric, i.e. w^i(¢j¢) = w^(¢j¢) for all i 2 Ir. This is essentially because H may have multiple
maximizes over (ai)i2Ir some of which are asymmetric.
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Theorem 1, we can show that the fair contract must o®er a ¯xed wage to each risk
averse agent.
Next we characterize the optimal contracts o®ered to risk neutral agents. Note
¯rst that the wage scheme of each risk averse agent in any fair contract is individu-
alistic by Lemma 2. Recall that w^i(yi) is the wage scheme of risk averse agent i in
a fair contract which implements action a^i from him. Due to (BB), the risk neutral
agents then obtain the residual revenue R(y) after subtracting total wages paid to
all risk averse agents
P
i2Ir w^
i(yi).
Then we de¯ne the actions of risk neutral agents, denoted by (~ai)i2In , which
maximize the expected residual surplus of organization after ¯xing the action pro¯le
ar ´ (a^i)i2Ir of risk averse agents:
a^i 2 argmax
ai2A
Ey[R(y)jar; ai; a^¡i]¡
X
i2In
Gi(ai)¡
X
i2Ir
Eyi [w^
i(yi)ja^i]:
We can show the following result:
Theorem 3. In any fair contract the risk neutral agents must choose the actions
(a^i)i2In so as to maximize the residual surplus of organization, given action pro¯le
of risk averse agents ar = (a^i)i2Ir .
Proof. Appendix.
5 Existence of Fair Contract
In this section we show the conditions under which there exists a fair contract.
Instead of showing C¤f 6= ;, we will return back to the original set of fair contracts
Cf and proceed to show the stronger result that Cf 6= ;. Due to Lemma 1, we know
that Cf µ Cf¤ . Thus, if we can show that Cf 6= ;, this implies Cf¤ 6= ;. Note here
that any fair contract in Cf is de¯ned in terms of incentive e±ciency (IE) but not
its modi¯ed version (IE¤).
Our strategy for existence proof is as follows: ¯rst, we set the wage scheme of
every risk averse agent as a ¯xed wage, i.e., wi(yi) = w for all yi 2 Y . Thus every
risk averse agent chooses the least costly action, ai = 0 for all i 2 Ir.
We then show that o®ering a ¯xed wage to every risk averse agent becomes
incentive e±cient when we take the ¯xed wage w to be large enough. To see this,
note that, if the ¯xed wage w is not incentive e±cient, there must exist a pro¯le
of other contracts (Ci)i2Ir for risk averse agents such that it solves the following
problem:
Problem (OP):
max
(Ci)i2Ir
E[R(y)jar; an]¡
X
i2Ir
P in(a
i)win
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subject toX
n
P in(a
i)u(wi(yn))¡Gi(ai) ¸
X
n
P in(a)u(w
i(yn))¡Gi(a) 8 a 6= ai; 8 i 2 Ir (IC)
X
n
P in(a
i)u(wi(yn))¡Gi(ai) ¸ u(w) 8 i 2 Ir (IR¤)
where ar ´ (ai)i2Ir and an ´ (ai)i2In denote vectors of actions taken by risk averse
and neutral agents respectively. Here (IC) denotes incentive compatibility constraint
for risk averse agent i and (IR¤) denotes the constraint such that risk averse agent
i is not worse o® compared to the case that he receives the ¯xed wage w. Note that
the expected wage paid to risk averse agent i, i.e.,
P
n P
i
n(a
i)win, is bounded below
from Á(Gi(ai) + u(w)) due to (IR¤) and concavity of u. Then such lower bound for
the expected wage of risk averse agent becomes large when w is taken to be large
as well. This is more likely to be so when higher action ai is implemented because
then higher payment must be compensated to risk averse agent for agreeing on an
alternative wage scheme. Thus risk neutral agents cannot be better o® by o®ering
other wage schemes than the ¯xed wage w to risk averse agent when the status quo
utility u(w) is large enough. Then the optimal solution to Problem (OP) involves
the implementation of only the least costly action from risk averse agents.
Second, given this result, we ¯nd the wage schemes of risk neutral agents which
are induced to choose the actions maximizing the residual surplus of organization
after subtracting the ¯xed wages of risk averse agents. More formally, we de¯ne the
optimal actions of risk neutral agents, denoted by ~an 2 ANn , which maximize the
total residual of surplus given all risk averse agents choosing the least costly action
ai = 0, as follows:
~an 2 arg max
an2ANn
RS(an) ´ Ey[R(y)j0;an]¡
X
i2In
Gi(ai) (8)
where 0 denotes Nr{dimensional vector of zeros. Then we can show that there
exists a single optimal action ~a ´ ~ai for any risk neutral agent i 2 In when the
heterogeneity among risk neutral agents is small enough. Given this, we will design
the wage scheme which implements the optimal single action ~a from every risk
neutral agent.
The most di±cult part of the proof is that we need to show that the wage schemes
constructed in the above way must satisfy no{envyness condition (NE). To deal with
this subtle issue, we will design the wage schemes of agents by exploiting the risk
aversion of risk averse agents such that they would face risky lottery if they were
o®ered the wage scheme of risk neutral agent, which prevents them from envying
risk neutral agents. On the other hand, the wage scheme of risk neutral agent is
designed such that his expected payo® is equal to the ¯xed wage o®ered to risk
averse agent. Thus risk neutral agent does not envy risk averse agents.
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Now we will proceed the formal argument for the proof of existence of fair con-
tract.
First, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 6. For any action a 2 A and any risk neutral agents i; j 2 In,¯¯¯
Gi(a)¡Gj(a)
¯¯¯
<
1
2
¯
where ¯ > 0 is given in Assumption 4.
Assumption 7. u0(+1) = 0.
Assumption 6 says that the di®erence between action costs of risk neutral agents
are not so large relative to the complementarity gains of actions ¯ de¯ned in As-
sumption 4. Assumption 7 ensures that Á0(+1) = +1.
Then we can show the following:
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 4 and 6 are satis¯ed. Then there exists a
single optimal action ~a 2 A such that ~ai = ~a maximizes the residual surplus of
organization RS(an) for all risk neutral agents i 2 In.
Proof. See Appendix.
For such optimal symmetric action ~a, we make the following condition:
Assumption 8. For some risk neutral agent l 2 In there exists no M + 1{
dimensional vector (¸m) ¸ 0, not all zero, such that
P
m ¸m = 1,X
m
¸mF
l
n(am) · F ln(~a)
and X
m
¸mGl(am) < Gl(~a) + ±
where ± > 0 is given in (6).
Assumption 8 says that there exists some risk neutral agent, say l, who cannot
improve the probability distribution of his performances F ln(a) in the sense of ¯rst
order stochastic dominance by using a mixes strategy ¸m over (am)M+1m=1 6= ~a at lower
expected action cost than the action ~a. This condition is more likely to be satis¯ed
when heterogeneity among risk averse agents ± is small enough, as long as F ln(a)
satis¯es Convexity of Distribution Function Condition (CDFC) and Gl is convex.8
8CDFC means that F in(a) is convex function of a. Suppose that F
l
n(a) satis¯es CDFC and Gl
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Assumption 8 then ensures that there exists a non-decreasing wage scheme which
implements the optimal action ~a from every risk neutral agent. Thus (MON) is
satis¯ed.
Finally, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 9. Ey[R(y)ja] = ©(a) + F
Assumption 9 says that the expected revenue of organization can be decomposed
into two parts: one is the part which varies with unobservable actions of agents and
the other is the part which is independent of these actions. Here F can be interpreted
as the base revenue which is independent of non{contractible action choices.9
Then we can show the following result:
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 and 6-9 are satis¯ed. Then, if the base
revenue of organization F is su±ciently large, there exists a fair contract C^ which
has the following features:
² the risk averse agents are o®ered the ¯xed wage scheme which induces them to
choose the least costly action ai = 0, and
² the risk neutral agents are o®ered the wage scheme which induce them to choose
the optimal action ~a each so as to maximize the residual surplus of organization
E[R(y)j0;an]¡
X
j2In
Gj(aj):
given all risk averse agents choose the least costly action ar = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The requirement that the base revenue F is large can ensure that the ¯xed wage
o®ered to each risk averse agent can be large enough without a®ecting the incentives
of risk neutral agents. Then, large enough ¯xed wage makes the payo® of risk averse
agents large as well so that the designed contract pro¯le becomes incentive e±cient
because it solves Problem (OP).
is convex. Then F ln(
P
n ¸a(m)) <
P
m ¸mF
l
n(a(m)) · F ln(~a) implies that a0 ´
P
m ¸ma(m) > ~a.
However, then we have
P
m ¸mGl(a(m)) > Gl(a
0) > Gl(~a) which implies that
P
m ¸mGl(a(m)) >
Gl(~a). The last inequality cannot hold when ± is small enough.
9This does not necessarily mean that F is independent of any kinds of agents' actions. It could
depend on contractible actions taken by agents.
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6 Discussion and Robustness
6.1 E±ciency First or Equity First?
When we have so far characterized fair contracts in Section 3 and 4, we have de¯ned
the set of fair contracts as Cf¤ which are the contracts satisfying (IE¤), (NE) and
(IR). In this de¯nition (IE¤) was referred to as the set of incentive feasible (i.e.,
budget balanced and incentive compatible) and monotonic contracts which are not
Pareto dominated by all other incentive feasible and monotonic contracts. Thus we
have imposed Pareto e±ciency only to the set of incentive feasible and monotonic
contracts which are not necessarily no{envy. This de¯nition of fair contracts can
be thus interpreted as follows: as the ¯rst step, agents of organization seek the
e±ciency constrained by incentive compatibility and monotonicity by ruling out the
consideration of no-envyness. Then, as the second step, they select among all these
contracts the one satisfying no{envyness (and (IR)). In other words, e±ciency is
taken as the ¯rst priority to be satis¯ed in organization whereas equity concern is
the objective to be accomplished after e±ciency is attained. In this section, by
taking into account the above interpretation, we will call fair contracts which we
have so far de¯ned e±ciency{¯rst optimal contracts. We will denote by C¤E the set
of e±ciency{¯rst optimal contracts. Of course, C¤E coincides with the set of fair
contracts C^ which we have characterized in Section 4.
However, in contrast to this case, one might think that equity can be considered
as the ¯rst priority to be satis¯ed in organization whereas e±ciency is the second
objective. For example, suppose that agents of organization ¯rst identify the set of
all no{envy contracts. Next, the agents ¯nd the Pareto e±cient contracts among all
possible no{envy, incentive feasible and monotonic contracts. We de¯ne by C¤¤E the
set of all the e±cient contracts de¯ned in this way and satisfying (IR). We will call
this equity{¯rst optimal contracts.
Then, we can show the following result:
Theorem 5. C¤E µ C¤¤E .
Proof. Take any e±ciency{¯rst optimal contract C 2 C¤E . Then we will show
that C 2 C¤¤E . To see this, suppose that C =2 C¤¤E . Then, C 2 C¤E implies that C
satis¯es all (IC), (NE), (IR), (BB) and (MON). Thus, the fact that C =2 C¤¤E implies
that there must exist some contract C 0 =2 C such that C 0 satis¯es (IC) and (NE),
and it Pareto dominates C. In particular C 0 satis¯es (IC) but Pareto dominates C.
However, since C 2 C¤E , C satis¯es (IC), and there exist no other contracts which
satisfy (IC), and Pareto dominate C. C 0 contradicts to this fact. Q.E.D.
Thus, by Theorem 5, we may have C¤¤E n C¤E 6= ; so that there may exist some
equity{¯rst optimal contract which does not have the property shown in Theorem
1-2 even when heterogeneity among agents is so small. We will show this by the
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following example:
Example. Suppose that Ir = f1; 2g and In = fpg. Here agent p is the principal.
Suppose also that A = f0; 1g and Y = fy2; y1g where y2 > y1. We also simplify
the model by assuming that R(y1; y2; yp) = R(y1; y2). Thus the principal's action
does not a®ect the expected revenue of organization. We thus set ap = 0. Without
loss of generality we take the principal as the residual claimant who receives all the
residual surplus of organization after subtracting the wages to risk averse agents.
Thus (BB) is satis¯ed and we ignore this.
Now consider the following optimization problem which minimizes the expected
wage of the principal when implementing actions a = (a1; a2) from risk averse agents
subject to (IC), (MON) and (NE), given each risk averse agent is guaranteed a
certain utility level U^ i:
min
X
i=1;2
Ey[wi(y)ja]
subject to
Ey[u(wi(y))ja]¡Gi(ai) ¸ Ey[ui(wi(y))ja; aj ]¡Gi(a); 8 a 6= ai (IC)
Ey[u(wi(y))ja]¡Gi(ai) ¸ U^ i (PE)
Ey[u(wi(y))ja]¡Gi(ai) ¸ Ey[u(wj(y))ja; aj ]¡Gi(a); 8 a (NE)
wi(y2; yj) ¸ wi(y1; yj) 8 i 6= j (MON)
Note that the contract which solves the above problem becomes an equity{¯rst
optimal contract because it is Pareto e±cient among all feasible contracts satisfying
(IC), (NE) and (MON).
Let EW ¤¤(a1; a2) be the expected total wage in the solution to the above prob-
lem. Then we de¯ne the principal's expected payo® as follows:
¦p(a1; a2) ´ Ey[R(y1; y2)ja1; a2]¡ EW ¤¤(a1; a2):
Then, we can verify that implementing high actions (a1; a2) = (1; 1) from both risk
averse agents maximize the principal's expected payo® ¦p(a1; a2) when ¢(1; 1) ´
Ey[R(y)j1; 1]¡maxa 6=1Ey[R(y)ja] is su±ciently large. This shows that the contract
which solves the above problem gives risk averse agents high{powered incentive to
choose high action instead of low action. Thus there may exist some equity{¯rst
optimal contract having the feature that high{powered incentive schemes are o®ered
to risk averse agents when ¢(1; 1) is su±ciently large.
The above example is in contrast to Theorem 1{2 that all e±ciency{¯rst optimal
contracts must have ¯xed wage schemes o®ered to risk averse agents. This gives an
interesting testable implication as follows: rewards of agents are more sensitive to
their objective performances in organizations in which equity among them is taken
as the ¯rst priority to be satis¯ed than in organizations in which e±ciency is the
¯rst priority to be satis¯ed.
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6.2 Robustness of the Results
We have so far paid our attention to the class of monotonic wage schemes (MON).
Although (MON) is a reasonable and realistic restriction, one might think that, once
we remove (MON) from the consideration of possible axioms, the set of contracts
is expanded so that all axioms may be satis¯ed at non-¯xed wages for risk averse
agents.
In this subsection we will discuss the robustness of our results when we remove
the axiom of monotonicity (MON).
First, we can show that our characterization results, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,
still remain true even if we drop (MON) from the axioms to be considered when we
impose the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and convexity of distribution
function condition (CDFC) on the probability distribution of each risk averse agent's
performances P in(a). MLRP means that the likelihood ratio P
i
n(a
0)=P in(a) of agent
i's performance is increasing in yn conditional on a0 > a. As we have already
mentioned, CDFC means that the distribution function F in(a) ´
P
l·n P
i
n(a) is
convex with respect to action levels a 2 A. Then, we modify Problem (CMj¡ a^j) by
dropping (MON) from the constraint set. Then, by a similar argument to Lemma 3,
we can show that any fair contract C^j of risk averse agent j must solve this modi¯ed
problem. Otherwise, it is not incentive e±cient. Then we can easily verify that
the optimal wage scheme which solves this modi¯ed problem becomes monotone
increasing by the standard argument when MLRP and CDFC are satis¯ed (see
Grossman and Hart (1983)). Thus, as long as MLRP and CDFC are met, we can
reach the same characterization results as Theorem 1-3.
Second, we will investigate the implications when we drop (MON) from the
axioms and still do not impose the restrictions on the probability distributions such
as MLRP and CDFC. We will then show that, even when we drop (MON), any
fair contract still has the ¯xed wage o®ered to every risk averse agent, provided
the heterogeneity among them is su±ciently small and the wage of each agent is
bounded below from some amount. We impose the limited liability (LL) instead of
(MON): for some w > ¡1,
wi(y) ¸ w; 8 i 2 I; 8 y 2 Y N (LL)
Then we call a contract pro¯le C incentive feasible if it satis¯es (BB), (IC) and
(LL). Let CL be the set of all incentive feasible contracts. We focus on this set CL.
Similarly, we de¯ne the incentive e±cient contract as follows: with a slight abuse of
de¯nition, a contract C 2 CL is said to be incentive e±cient, denoted by (IE¤¤), if
no other contract C 2 CL exists such that it Pareto improve the expected utilities
of agents. A fair contract C is de¯ned analogously: C is said to be fair if it satis¯es
(IE¤¤), (NE) and (IR).
Then we can show the following result:
Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumption 1, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose also that (MON)
22
is replaced by (LL). Then there exists some non-empty set D ½ <2+ such that for all
("; ±) 2 D any fair contract C^ involves a ¯xed wage o®ered to all risk averse agents.
Proof. See Appendix.
By (LL), we can ensure that the utility payment for every risk averse agent
u(w(yn)) is bounded below from u ´ u(w). Also (BB) requires that the utility
payment u(w(yn)) is bounded above by u(R ¡ (N ¡ 1)w) where R ´ maxyR(y).
Thus the utility payment un ´ u(w(yn)) is bounded for each yn 2 Y . Then we can
show that, when heterogeneity among risk averse agents is small enough so that "
is su±ciently small relative to ±, Assumption 3 is satis¯ed and hence we can reach
the same characterization result as Theorem 1 and 2.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have characterized fair contracts which are incentive e±cient and
no{envy in general moral hazard environments. Then we have shown that fair
contracts must have the feature that risk averse agents are o®ered the ¯xed wage
scheme. On the other hand, risk neutral agents are motivated to work in order
to maximize the residual surplus of organization after subtracting the ¯xed wages
of risk averse agents. Then the tension between incentive e±ciency and equity as
no{envy makes characterization of contracts drastically simple. We have also shown
the conditions under which a fair contract exists.
Our concept of no{envyness is based on ex ante view before agents choose their
actions and hence ¯nal outcomes are realized. One might think that no{envy con-
straint is binding even ex post after the ¯nal performances are realized. In such case
ex post no{envy constraint becomes more stringent than the ex ante one: suppose
that the performances of agents y 2 Y N are realized. Then agent i does not envy
agent j ex post if and only if u(wi(yi)) ¸ u(wj(yi)), conditional on his own perfor-
mance yi. Then, we must have wi(y) = wj(y) for any y 2 Y and all i 6= j. Hence
we can reach the same conclusions as Theorem 1 and 2.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that some fair contract C^i is not individualistic for some risk averse agent
k 2 Ir, i.e., w^k(y) depends on y¡k. Let u^k(y) ´ uk(w^k(y)). Then we de¯ne the new
contract ~uk(yk) for that agent k as
~uk(yk) ´ Ey¡k [u^k(yk; y¡k)ja^¡k]
and consider an alternative contract C 6= C^ as follows:
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² For the risk averse agent k, the new contract C = f~uk; a^kg is o®ered.
² Pick one risk neutral agent, say agent n. Then, for all other agents i 6= n; k,
we de¯ne a new wage scheme as
~wi(yi) ´ Ey¡i [w^i(yi; y¡i)ja^¡i] 8 yi 2 Y:
² For the risk neutral agent n, the following wage scheme ~wn(y) is o®ered
~wn(y) ´ R(y)¡
X
i2I;i6=k
~wi(y)¡ ~wk(yk)
where ~wk(yk) ´ Á(~uk(yk)).
First, note that such alternative wage scheme (~ukn)yn2Y o®ered to risk averse
agent k satis¯es (MON) because the original scheme (ukn)yn2Y satis¯es (MON) and
yi and y¡i are statistically independent. By the same reason, the new scheme ~wi(yi)
o®ered to agent i 6= k; n is also non-decreasing and hence (MON) is satis¯ed. Since
~wi(yi), i 6= k; n, is independent of the performance of the selected risk neutral agent
n, ~wn(y) is also non-decreasing in yn because R is non-decreasing in yn. Thus
(MON) is satis¯ed for the risk neutral agent n as well.
Second, since (IC) is satis¯ed at C^k, we have
Ey[u^k(y)ja^k; a^¡k]¡Gk(a^k) ¸ Ey[u^k(y)jak; a^¡k]¡Gk(ak); 8 ak 6= a^k;
which, by independence of yi and y¡i, implies that
Eyk [~u
k(yk)ja^k]¡Gk(a^k) ¸ Eyk [~uk(yk)jak]¡Gk(ak); 8 ak 6= a^k:
Thus the new contract ~uk satis¯es (IC) for the risk averse agent k who chooses the
same action a^k, given a^¡k. All other agents than k and n also choose the same
actions a^¡k¡n as well. It is also true that all agents except n will obtain the same
expected payo®s under the new contract as under the original one.
Now consider the incentive of the risk neutral agent n. Agent n would receive
the following expected payo® under the new contract ~wn(y):
max
an2A
Ey[ ~wn(y)jan; a^¡n]¡Gn(an) ¸ Ey[ ~wn(y)ja^n; a^¡n]¡Gn(a^n)
= Ey[R(y)ja^]¡
X
i2I;i6=k;n
Ey[w^i(y)ja^i]
¡Eyk [ ~wk(yk)ja^k]¡Gn(a^n)
> Ey[R(y)ja^]¡
X
i2I;i6=k;n
Ey[w^i(y)ja^]¡ Ey[w^k(y)ja^]¡Gn(a^n):
= Ey[w^n(y)ja^]¡Gn(a^n)
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Here the last equality follows from (BB) and the strict inequality from the risk
aversion of agent k (concavity of u), the Jensen's inequality and the dependence of
w^k(yk; y¡k) on y¡k:
Ey[w^k(yk; y¡k)ja^]
= Ey[Á(u^k(yk; y¡k))ja^k; a^¡k]
= Eyk [Ey¡k [Á(u^
k(yk; y¡k))ja^¡k]a^k]
> Eyk [Á(Ey¡k [u^
k(yk; y¡k)ja^¡k])ja^k]
= Eyk [Á(~u
k(yk))ja^k]
= Eyk [ ~w
k(yk)ja^k]
respectively. Thus the risk neutral agent n can be strictly better o® under the new
contract ~wn(y), which contradicts the fact that C^ is incentive e±cient. Q.E.D.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Consider Problem (CMj ¡ a^j) for implementing the action a = a^j speci¯ed in the
fair contract C^j from risk averse agent j. As we have argued in the main text, the
constraint set of such problem is non-empty, compact and convex. Thus the optimal
wage scheme which solves Problem (CMj ¡ a^j) exists and is unique. We denote by
w^j(yja^j) the optimal wage scheme which solves Problem (CMj ¡ a^j).
Suppose that for some risk averse agent j 2 Ir the the wage scheme w^j(y)
speci¯ed in the fair contract C^j = fw^j(y); a^jg di®ers from the optimal wage scheme
w^j(yja^j): w^j(y) 6= w^j(yja^j) for some y 2 Y . Then, note that w^j(y) satis¯es (IC) and
(IR¤) in Problem (CMj ¡ a^j) so that it is feasible in Problem (CMj ¡ a^j) and that
w^j(yja^j) is uniquely determined to solve the problem (CMj ¡ a^j) given U^ j . Thus
we must have
Eyj [w^
j(yj)ja^j ] ´
X
n
P jn(a^
j)w^j(yn) > Eyj [w^
j(yj ja^j)ja^j ] ´
X
n
P jn(a^
j)w^j(ynja^j):
Then consider an alternative contract o®ered to the above risk averse agent j as
Cj = fw^j(yj ja^j); a^jg. Without loss of generality we can also assume that the wage
schemes of other risk neutral agents than n depend solely on their own performances
because (yi; y¡i) are statistically independent and hence their action incentives are
not changed by removing the dependence of the others' performances on their wage
schemes. Thus all others than n choose the same actions a^i as before.
But now consider an alternative contract o®ered to the selected risk neutral agent
n 2 In as Cn = f ~wn(y); ~ang where
~wn(y) = R(y)¡
X
l 6=j
w^l(yl)¡ w^j(yj ja^j)
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and ~an is de¯ned as the action to maximize the expected utility of agent n:
~an 2 argmax
a2A
Ey[ ~wn(y)ja; a^¡n]¡Gn(a):
Then such risk neutral agent n can be strictly better o® because
Ey[ ~wn(y)j~an; a^¡n]¡Gn(~an)
¸ Ey[ ~wn(y)ja^n; a^¡n]¡Gn(a^n)
= Ey[R(y)ja^]¡
X
l 6=j
Eyl [w^
l(yl)ja^l]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja^j)ja^j ]¡Gn(a^n)
> Ey[R(y)ja^]¡
X
i2I
Ey[w^i(yi)ja^i]¡Gn(a^n)
= Ey[w^n(y)ja^n]¡Gn(a^n)
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the de¯nition of ~an which maximizes the agent
n's expected utility, the second inequality from Eyj [w^j(yj)ja^j ] > Eyj [w^j(yj ja^j)ja^j ]
and the ¯nal equality from (BB) respectively. Q.E.D.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Take any fair contract C^. Suppose contrary to the claim that there are less than
Nr ¡M risk averse agents who choose the least costly action (zero). Then, by our
supposition that #A = M + 1 · #Ir = Nr, there must exist at least two risk
averse agents, say i and j, who choose the same action, say a^ > 0. Without loss of
generality we suppose that i > j in the sense of Assumption 3.
Let u^kn ´ u(w^k(yn)), k = i; j, for each yn 2 Y . Then we obtain the following
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series of expressions:X
n
P jn(a^)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a^)
¸
X
n
P jn(a^)u^
i
n ¡Gj(a^)
=
X
n
P in(a^)u^
i
n ¡Gi(a^) +
(
Gi(a^)¡Gj(a^) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in
)
¸
X
n
P in(a)u^
j
n ¡Gi(a) +
(
Gi(a^)¡Gj(a^) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in
)
=
X
n
P jn(a)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a)
+
(
Gj(a)¡Gi(a) +
X
n
(P in(a)¡ P jn(a))u^in
)
+
(
Gi(a^)¡Gj(a^) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^jn
)
=
X
n
P jn(a)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a)
+
(
¢Gi(a^; a)¡¢Gj(a^; a) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in ¡
X
n
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u^jn
)
for any a < a^. Here the ¯rst inequality follows from (NE) for agent j and the
second inequality from (NE) of agent i respectively. Thus we can reach the following
inequality: X
n
P jn(a^)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a^) ¸
X
n
P jn(a)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a) +W (a^; aju^i; u^j) (A1)
where u^k ´ (u^kn)Ln=1 denotes the vector of the utility payments for k = i; j and
W (a^; aju^i; u^j) ´
(
¢Gi(a^; a)¡¢Gj(a^; a) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in ¡
X
n
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u^jn
)
:
Since the above inequality (A1) holds for any action a < a^, we take an action
a < a^ such that (IC) of agent j is binding:X
n
P jn(a^)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a^) =
X
n
P jn(a)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a):
Such action a must exist: otherwise the action a^ must be the smallest among all
relevant actions when solving Problem (CMj ¡ a^) because (IC) of agent j in that
problem is not binding at any a < a^. Thus the optimal wage which solves Problem
(CMj ¡ a^), denoted w^j(yja^), must be the ¯xed wage but then this does not satisfy
(IC). Thus (IC) of agent j must be binding at some a < a^.
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Now we show that W (a^; aju^i; u^j) > 0 for such action a < a^ that (IC) of agent j
is binding. To see this, note that u^i = (u^in)
L
n=1 must satisfy (IC) of agent i:X
n
P in(a^)u^
i
n ¡Gi(a^) ¸
X
n
P in(a)u^
i
n ¡Gi(a)
which can be written byX
n
(F in(a)¡ F in(a^))¢uin ¸ ¢Gi(a^; a)
where ¢uin ´ u^in ¡ uin¡1 for each i = 2; :::; L. By (MON) ¢uin ¸ 0 must hold for
each i = 2; :::; L.
Then, since F in(a) > F
i
n(a^) for each n when a^ > a, we can show thatX
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in =
X
n
(F in(a^)¡ F jn(a^))¢uin
=
X
n
Ã
F in(a^)¡ F jn(a^)
F in(a)¡ F in(a^)
!
(F in(a)¡ F in(a^))¢uin
=
X
n
Ã
F in(a)¡ F jn(a^)
F in(a)¡ F in(a^)
¡ 1
!
(F in(a)¡ F in(a^))¢uin
=
X
n
¸in(a^; aji; j)(F in(a)¡ F in(a^))¢uin
¸ (¸i(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)
X
n
(F in(a)¡ F in(a^))¢uin
¸ (¸i(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)¢Gi(a^; a)
where the last inequality follows from (IC) of agent i and ¸i > 1 (due to F jn(a^) <
F in(a) for i > j by Assumption 2 (ii)).
Next, the binding (IC) of agent j can be written byX
n
(F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^))¢ujn = ¢Gj(a^; a):
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By using this and F jn(a) > F
j
n(a^) for a^ > a, we can show thatX
n
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u^jn =
X
n
(F in(a)¡ F jn(a))¢ujn
=
X
n
Ã
F in(a)¡ F jn(a)
F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^)
!
(F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^))¢ujn
=
X
n
Ã
F in(a)¡ F jn(a^)
F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^)
¡ 1
!
(F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^))¢ujn
=
X
n
¸jn(a^; aji; j)(F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^))¢ujn
· (¸j(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)
X
n
(F jn(a)¡ F jn(a^))¢ujn
= (¸j(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)¢Gj(a^; a)
By combining the above inequalities, we obtainX
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in ¡
X
n
(Pnj(a)¡ P in(a))u^jn
=
X
n
(F in(a^)¡ F jn(a^))¢uin ¡
X
n
(F in(a)¡ F jn(a))¢ujn
¸ (¸i(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)¢Gi(a^; a)¡ (¸j(a^; aji; j)¡ 1)¢Gj(a^; a)
> ¡¢Gi(a^; a) + ¢Gj(a^; a)
due to Assumption 3. Thus we have established that W (a^; aju^i; u^j) > 0 for the
action a < a^ such that (IC) of agent j is binding.
Then inequality (A1) implies thatX
n
P jn(a^)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a^) >
X
n
P jn(a)u^
j
n ¡Gj(a)
which contradicts the supposition that (IC) of agent j is binding at a < a^.
Thus our ¯rst supposition that there are less than Nr ¡M risk averse agents
who choose the least costly action is false. This completes our proof. Q.E.D.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
First, note that Assumption 3 is satis¯ed when " is small enough because then
¸
k(a^; a)! 1 and ¸k(a^; a)! 1 for all i; j 2 Ir and all a^; a 2 A. Then Assumption 5
implies Assumption 3 when we take " to be small enough given ±.
By Lemma 3, the wage scheme w^j(yj) speci¯ed in fair contract C^j must be equal
to w^j(yj ja^j) for any risk averse agent j 2 Ir which solves problem (CMj ¡ a^j). Now
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replace agent j by agent i in Problem (CMj ¡ a^j), denoted by Problem (CMi ¡ a^j)
which minimizes the expected wage paid to risk averse agent i, i.e.
P
n P
i
n(a^
j)w(yn),
subject to (IC) and (IR¤) for agent i (but not agent j) who is induced to choose
the action a^j speci¯ed in the fair contract o®ered to agent j (but not agent i). In
general, such problem may have no optimal solutions because the constraint set
may be empty as opposed to Problem (CMj¡ a^j). However, we can show that when
heterogeneity among risk averse agents is su±ciently small (("; ±) is small enough)
the optimal wage scheme which solves the problem (CMi ¡ a^j) exists and is very
close to w^j(yja^j) the optimal wage scheme which solves Problem (CMj ¡ a^j).
Lemma A1. There exist some ± > 0 and " > 0 such that¯¯¯¯
¯X
n
P jn(a^
j)w^j(ynja^j)¡
X
n
P in(a^
j)w^i(ynja^j)
¯¯¯¯
¯ < 12¯
for any risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir, i 6= j, where ¯ is given in Assumption 4.
Proof. Take any fair contract C^ and the corresponding expected utility of agent i
as U^ i.
Then we ¯rst show the following:
Claim A1-1. jU^ i¡U^ j j goes to zero as the di®erence between agents i and j (captured
by ± and ") becomes very small.
Proof. Let w^kn ´ w^k(yn) and ¢uin ´ u^kn ¡ u^kn¡1 for each yn 2 Y .
Then we derive
U^ j ´
X
n
P jn(a^
j)u(w^jn)¡Gj(a^j)
¸
X
n
P jn(a^
i)u(w^in)¡Gj(a^i) (by (NE))
=
X
n
P jn(a^
i)u(w^in)¡Gi(a^i) + fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g
=
X
n
(1¡ F jn(a^i))¢uin ¡Gi(a^i) + fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g
=
X
n
(1¡ F in(a^i))¢uin ¡Gi(a^i) + fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g+
X
n
(F in(a^
i)¡ F jn(a^i))¢uin
= U^ i + fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g+
X
n
(F in(a^
i)¡ F jn(a^i))¢uin
¸ U^ i + fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g+ (¸ i(a^i; a)¡ 1)¢Gi(a^i; a)
¸ U^ i ¡ ~"+ fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g
where ~" > 0 is de¯ned as
~" ¸ j(¸i(a^; a)¡ 1)¢Gi(a^; a)j (A2)
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for all a^; a 2 A and all i 2 Ir. Note that ~" can be close to zero as " ! 0 because
then ¸i(a^; a)! 1.
Thus we obtain
U^ j ¸ U^ i ¡ ~"+ fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g (A3)
Similarly, we have
U^ i ¸ U^ j ¡ ~"+ fGj(a^j)¡Gi(a^j)g: (A4)
By adding (A3) and (A4), we derive
fGi(a^j)¡Gj(a^j)g+ ~"+ U^ i
¸ U^ j
¸ U^ i ¡ ~"+ fGi(a^i)¡Gj(a^i)g
¸ U^ i ¡ ~"+ fGi(a^j)¡Gj(a^j)g ¡ ±
from which U^ i ¡ U^ j goes to zero as ± and " go to zero (hence ~" ! 0). Also, when
" = 0 and ± = 0, we have U^ i = U^ j . Thus there exists some small ~½ > 0 such that
jU^ i ¡ U^ j j · ~½ for any i; j 2 Ir, when ("; ±)! 0. Q.E.D.
Now, we pick any risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir. Then we consider the modi¯ed
problem of Problem (CMj ¡ a) which implements a 2 A from risk averse agent j by
keeping (MON) while replacing (IR) and (IC¤) byX
n
P jn(a)u(w(yn))¡Gj(a) ¸ U^ j ¡ ½ (IR¤½)
andX
n
P jn(a)u(w(yn))¡Gj(a) ¸
X
n
P jn(a
0)u(w(yn))¡Gj(a0)¡ ½; 8 a0 6= a (IC½)
respectively where ½ > 0 (we will give a precise de¯nition of ½ later.)
We call such modi¯ed problem of (CMj ¡ a) Problem (CMj½ ¡ a). Then we can
show the following result:
Claim A1-2. The solution to Problem (CMj½ ¡ a), denoted (w^j½(ynja))n, exists and
is uniquely determined if the constraint set is non-empty.
Proof. To save notation, we drop superscript j to index agent j in the following
proof. Let w(yn) ´ wn for each yn 2 Y . We change the variable as un ´ u(wn)
and hence wn = Á(un) where Á = u¡1 is inverse of u. Then (MON) is replaced by
Á(un) ¸ Á(un¡1) because of yn > yn¡1.
Let ¡(a) be the constraint the set of u ´ (un)n satisfying all (IC½), (IR¤½) and
(MON) in Problem (CMj½ ¡ a). Then we show that ¡(a) is a convex set. Take
u;u0 2 ¡(a) and let u00 ´ ¸u + (1 ¡ ¸)u0 for a scalar ¸ 2 (0; 1). Then we can see
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that u00 satis¯es (IC½) and (IR¤½) because these constraints are linear with u. Thus
it su±ces to show that u00 satis¯es (MON). To see this, note that
Á(u00n)¡ Á(u00n¡1) ¸ Á0(u00n¡1)(u00n ¡ u00n¡1)
= Á0(u00n¡1)[¸(un ¡ un¡1) + (1¡ ¸)(u0n ¡ u0n¡1)]
¸ 0
due to Á0 > 0 and u0n ¸ u0n¡1 and un ¸ un¡1 by (MON). Thus u00 2 ¡(a) and hence
¡(a) is a convex set.
Note that ¡(a) is closed because Á is continuous. Also ¡(a) can be bounded (see
Grossman and Hart (1983)). Thus ¡(a) is compact set. Since the objective functionP
n P
j
n(a)Á(un) is continuous and convex with respect to un, a solution to Problem
(CMj½ ¡ a) exists and is unique if the constraint set ¡(a) is non-empty. Q.E.D.
Thus, if the constraint set of Problem (CMj½ ¡ a) is non-empty, by the Berge's
Maximum Theorem, w^j½(yja) is continuous in ½.
Recall that w^j(yja^j) is the optimal wage scheme which solves Problem (CMj¡a^j).
We denote u^in ´ u(w^i(yn)) and u^i(ynja) ´ ui(w^i(ynja)). Then Lemma 3 shows that
the fair contract w^j(y) must be equal to w^j(yja^j). Thus we have u^in ´ u^i(ynja^i) for
each i 2 Ir.
Then we show the following claim.
Claim A1-3. There exists some K < +1 such that jU^ ij · K for all i 2 Ir.
Proof. By (IR), we have U^ i ¸ U i. Thus U^ i is bounded below.
Second, by using Problem (CMi¡a^i) and convexity of Á, we also obtainPn P in(a^i)Á(u^in) =P
n P
i
n(a^
i)(u^i(ynja^i)) ¸ Á
¡P
n P
i
n(a^
i)u^i(ynja^i)
¢ ¸ Á(Gi(a^i) + U^ i). Thus, if U^ i !
+1 for some i 2 Ir, the expected wage of such agent i goes to in¯nity, i.e.,P
n P
i
n(a^
i)Á(u^in) ! +1, so that the payo® of some risk neutral agent must be
negatively in¯nite but this violates (IR) of that agent. Thus U^ i must be bounded
above as well. Q.E.D.
As we have already mentioned, w^i(yja^i) which solves Problem (CMi ¡ a^i) for
implementing a^i exists and is unique. Thus w^i(yja^i) is well-de¯ned. Then w^i(yja^i) is
bounded for all U^ i 2 [U i;K], i.e., there exists someM < +1 such that ju(w^i(yja^i))j ·
M for all y 2 Y and all U^ i 2 [U i;K].
Then we can show the following:
Claim A1-4. For all a 2 A and all i 6= j, i; j 2 Ir, we have¯¯¯¯
¯X
n
P in(a)u^
i(ynja^i)¡Gi(a)¡
(X
n
P jn(a)u^
i(ynja^i)¡Gj(a)
)¯¯¯¯
¯! 0
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as ("; ±)! 0
Proof. We obtain ¯¯¯¯
¯X
n
(P in(a)¡ P jn(a))u^i(ynja^i) + (Gj(a)¡Gi(a))
¯¯¯¯
¯
·
X
n
¯¯
P in(a)¡ P jn(a)
¯¯
u^i(ynja^i) +
¯¯
Gj(a)¡Gi(a)
¯¯
·
X
n
¯¯
P in(a)¡ P jn(a)
¯¯
M +
¯¯
Gj(a)¡Gi(a)
¯¯
which goes to zero as ("; ±)! 0 for all a 2 A (note that A is a ¯nite set). Q.E.D.
By Claim A1-4, we can ¯nd some small enough ½^ > 0 such that¯¯¯¯
¯X
n
P in(a)u^
i(ynja^i)¡Gi(a)¡
(X
n
P jn(a)u^
i(ynja^i)¡Gj(a)
) ¯¯¯¯
¯· ½^ (A5)
when ("; ±) is small enough.
In what follows we de¯ne ½ ´ maxf~½+ ½^; 2½^g.
Now we consider Problem (CMj½¡ a^i) for the de¯ned value ½ > 0 and then show
that the wage scheme w^i(yja^i) is feasible in Problem (CMj½¡ a^i) for implementing a^i,
i.e., it satis¯es (MON), (IR¤½) and (IC½). It is clear that (MON) is satis¯ed because
w^i(yja^i) is monotonic by de¯nition. To see that it also satis¯es (IR¤½) and (IC½),
note ¯rst thatX
n
P jn(a^
i)u(w^i(ynja^i))¡Gj(a^i) ¸
X
n
P in(a^
i)u(w^i(ynja^i))¡Gi(a^i)¡ ½^
¸ U^ i ¡ ½^
¸ U^ j ¡ (~½+ ½^)
¸ U^ j ¡ ½
where the ¯rst inequality follows from Claim 4-4, the second inequality from the fact
that w^i(yja^i) satis¯es (IR¤) of Problem (CMi ¡ a^i) to implement a^i from agent i,
the third inequality from jU^ j ¡ U^ ij · ~½ and the last inequality from the de¯nition
of ½ respectively. This shows that w^i(yja^i) satis¯es (IR¤½) in Problem (CMj ¡ a^i) for
implementation of a^i.
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Also we haveX
n
P jn(a^
i)u(w^i(ynja^i))¡Gj(a^i) ¸
X
n
P in(a)u(w^
i(ynja))¡Gi(a)¡ ½^
¸
X
n
P in(a
0)u(w^i(ynja))¡Gi(a0)¡ ½^
¸
X
n
P jn(a
0)u(w^i(ynja))¡Gj(a0)¡ 2½^
¸
X
n
P jn(a
0)u(w^i(ynja))¡Gj(a0)¡ ½
where the ¯rst and third inequalities follow from the de¯nition of ½^ (see (A5)), the
second inequality from the fact that w^i(yja^i) satis¯es (IC) of Problem (CMi ¡ a^i)
to implement a^i 2 A from agent i and the last inequality from the de¯nition of ½
respectively.
The above argument shows that w^i(yja^i) satis¯es (IR¤½), (IC¤½) and (MON) of
Problem (CMj½¡ a^i). Thus w^i(yja^i) is feasible in Problem (CMj½¡ a^i). This implies
that the constraint set of Problem (CMj½¡ a^i) is non-empty for implementation of a^i.
Thus the optimal wage scheme w^j½(yja^i) which solves such problem is well-de¯ned.
Also, by optimality of w^j½(yja^i), we haveX
n
P jn(a^
i)w^i(ynja^i) ¸
X
n
P jn(a^
i)w^j½(ynja^i): (A6)
By changing the role of i and j in the above argument, we can show that w^j(yja^j)
is feasible in the problem (CMi½ ¡ a^j). Thus we haveX
n
P in(a^
j)w^j(ynja^j) ¸
X
n
P in(a^
j)w^i½(ynja^j): (A7)
Then we show Lemma A1 as follows: ¯rst, note that w^j½(yja^i) is continuous in ½
and that lim½!0 w^
j
½(yja^i) = w^j(yja^i) = w^i(yja^i) for each y 2 Y because U^ i = U^ j ,
P jn(a) = P in(a) and Gi(a) = Gj(a) are all satis¯ed when ½ = 0 so that ("; ±) = (0; 0),
and hence the optimal wage schemes which solve Problem (CMk ¡ a^i) for agents
k = i; j must be the same for implementation of a given action a^i. Then, since
w^i(yja^i) is well-de¯ned, w^j(yja^i) does so when ½ = 0. Then, by letting " and ±
to be small enough (thus ½ ! 0), we obtain from (A6) that Pn P in(a^i)w^i(ynja^i) 'P
n P
j
n(a^i)w^i(ynja^i) ¸
P
n P
j
n(a^i)w^
j
½(ynja^i) '
P
n P
j
n(a^i)w^j(ynja^i). Also, from (A7)
we obtain
P
n P
j
n(a^j)w^j(ynja^j) '
P
n P
i
n(a^
j)w^j(ynja^j) ¸
P
n P
i
n(a^
j)w^i½(ynja^j) 'P
n P
i
n(a^
j)w^i(ynja^j). Thus, by taking small enough ("; ±) so that ½ is close to zero,
we can ensure the inequalities in Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
In what follows we ¯x such " > 0 and ± > 0 to ensure Lemma A1.
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Lemma A2. a^i = a^j must hold for all risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir in any fair
contract C^.
Proof. Take any fair contract C^. Then ¯rst note that the action pro¯le a^r 2 ANr
of risk averse agents must maximize the expected residual surplus which the risk
neutral agents totally receive after paying the total expected wages to all risk averse
agents:
Ey[R(y)jar;an]¡
X
i2Ir
Eyi [w^
i(yi)jai]:
Otherwise, C^ is not incentive e±cient because some risk neutral agents can be strictly
better o® by implementing the action pro¯le of risk averse agents ar which maximizes
the above expected residual surplus. In this proof we will omit the vector of the risk
neutral agents' actions an from the argument of the above function because it does
not play any role in the proof.
Here recall that, since the fair contract must solve Problem (CMi ¡ a^i) for each
risk averse agent i 2 Ir, we have w^i(y) = w^i(yja^i) for each i 2 Ir.
Now suppose that a^j ´ a00 > a^i ´ a0 for some risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir. Then
we have
Ey[R(y)ja^j ; a^i; a^¡i¡j ]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja^j)ja^j ]
¸ Ey[R(y)ja^i; a^i; a^¡i¡j ]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja^i)ja^i]
and
Ey[R(y)ja^i; a^j ; a^¡i¡j ]¡ Eyi [w^i(yija^i)ja^i]
¸ Ey[R(y)ja^j ; a^j ; a^¡i¡j ]¡ Eyi [w^i(yija^j)ja^j ]:
From these inequalities, we derive
Eyi [w^
i(yija00)ja00]¡ Eyi [w^i(yija0)ja0]
¸ ¢i(a00ja00; a0)
¸ ¢j(a00ja00; a0)¡ ®
¸ ¢j(a0ja00; a0) + ~¯¡ ® (by Assumption 4)
¸ Eyj [w^j(yj ja00)ja00]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja0)ja0] + ¯
and hence by Lemma A1
1
2
¯ > Eyi [w^
i(yija00)ja00]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja00)ja00]
¸ Eyi [w^i(yija0)ja0]¡ Eyj [w^j(yj ja0)ja0] + ¯
> ¡1
2
¯ + ¯
=
1
2
¯;
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a contradiction. Thus we must have a^j = a^i. Q.E.D.
By Lemma A2, we must have a^j = a^i for any i; j 2 Ir, i 6= j, in any fair contract
C^. Thus we will denote a^i = a^ for all i 2 Ir.
Now we pick any two risk averse agents i; j 2 Ir where i > j in the sense of
Assumption 5. Suppose then that a^ ´ a^i = a^j > 0. Then, since Assumption 3 is
satis¯ed under Assumption 5 when " is small enough given ±, we know from the
proof of Theorem 1 that (IC) of Problem (CMj ¡ a^) must be slack for more e±cient
risk averse agent j at any action a < a^j = a^ under the fair contract w^j(y). However,
this contradicts to the fact that the optimal wage scheme w^j(y) = w^j(yja^) which
solves Problem (CMj¡ a^) must have the property that (IC) is binding at some a < a^
(otherwise, the contract which solves Problem (CMj ¡ a^) must be the ¯xed wage
contract but then it cannot satisfy (IC) for agent j to choose a^ > 0). Thus the
supposition that a^ > 0 is false, so we must have a^ = 0. Since a^l = a^k for all l; k 2 Ir
by Lemma A2, we then have a^i = 0 for all i 2 Ir. Then (IE¤) implies that w^i(y)
must be the ¯xed wage contract, i.e., w^i(y) does not depend on y 2 Y for all i 2 Ir
(otherwise, a^j = 0 but w^j(y) is not ¯xed wage for some j 2 Ir. However this is
not incentive e±cient because o®ering a ¯xed wage contract to such agent j 2 Ir
improves the welfare of some risk neutral agents while keeping all the actions and
contracts of others unchanged.)
We de¯ne the set of the values " and ± representing the heterogeneity of agents
as follows:
D ´ f("; ±) 2 <+ j ("; ±) satis¯es (6), (7) and Lemma A1.g:
Then we obtain Theorem 2 for all ("; ±) 2 D. Q.E.D.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Given an action pro¯le of risk averse agents in a fair contract ar = (a^i)i2Ir , the
maximum residual surplus which all risk neutral agents can share is
E[R(y)jar;an]¡
X
i2In
Gi(ai)¡
X
i2Ir
Eyi [w^
i(yi)ja^i]
where an = (ai)i2In denotes the vector of actions of risk neutral agents.
By de¯nition, (~ai)i2In maximizes the above surplus. Let de¯ne the best response
of action ai for each risk neutral agent i 2 In, given a¡i 2 ANn¡1:
BRi(a¡i) ´ argmax
ai2A
Ey[R(y)jar; (ai; a¡i)]¡
X
i2In
Gi(ai):
Then, the de¯nition of ~ai means that ~ai 2 BRi(~a¡i) for each i 2 In.
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Now suppose contrary to the claim that the wage schemes of risk neutral agents
in some fair contract w^i(y) do not implement the optimal actions (~ai)i2In de¯ned
above. Let (a^i)i2In be the implemented action pro¯le of risk neutral agents under
fw^i(y)gi2In . Since (a^i) does not maximize the residual surplus, there must exist
some risk neutral agent k such that
a^k =2 BRk(a^¡k):
Then we de¯ne the alternative wage schemes as follows:
~wi(yi) ´ Ey¡i [w^i(yi; y¡i)ja^¡i]; 8 i 6= k 8 i 2 In; ;
~wi(yi) = w^i(yi) 8 i 2 Ir;
and
~wk(y) = R(y)¡
X
i6=k;i2I
~wi(yi)
Note that the wage scheme of risk neutral agent k depends on y¡k only through
R(y) so that its expected wage depends on a¡k only through E[R(y)jak; a¡k].
These new schemes satisfy (BB) by construction. Also, since fw^i(y)gi2In imple-
ments the action pro¯le (a^i)i2In and (yi)i2In are statistically independent, the new
scheme ~wi(yi) still implements action a^i from agent i 6= k. Thus all agents but k
chooses the same actions a^i as before. Finally, risk neutral agent k has the strict in-
centive to choose some action in BRk(a^¡k) rather than a^k because of a^k =2 BRk(a^¡k).
Then we have
max
a2A
Ey[ ~wk(y)jar; (a; a^¡k)]¡Gk(a)¡
X
i6=k
Eyi [ ~w
i(yi)ja^i]
= max
a2A
Ey[R(y)jar; (a; a^¡k)]¡Gk(a)¡
X
i6=k
Ey[w^i(y)ja^]
> Ey[R(y)jar; a^k; a^¡k]¡Gk(a)¡
X
i6=k
Eyi [w^
i(yi)ja^]
= Ey[w^k(y)jar; (a^k; a^¡k)]¡Gk(a^k)
where the inequality follows from a^k =2 BRk(a^¡k) and the last equality from (BB):
R(y) =
P
i2I w^
i(y).
However, then this contradicts the fact that C^i = fw^i; a^ig is incentive e±cient.
Q.E.D.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that Assumption 4 and 6 hold. Suppose also contrary to the claim that
there exists some asymmetric optimal action pro¯le ~an which maximizes the residual
surplus RS(an). Then there must exist some l; k 2 In, l 6= k such that ~al 6= ~ak.
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Let a00 ´ ~al > a0 ´ ~ak without loss of generality. Then we have
Ey[R(y)j0; a00; a0; ~a¡l¡k]¡Gl(a00)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; a0; a0; ~a¡l¡k]¡Gl(a0)
and
Ey[R(y)j0; a0; a00; ~a¡l¡k]¡Gk(a0)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; a00; a00; ~a¡l¡k]¡Gk(a00):
By adding these inequalities, we have
Gk(a00)¡Gk(a0) ¸ ¢k(a00ja00; a0)
¸ ¢k(a0ja00; a0) + ~¯
¸ ¢l(a0ja00; a0)¡ ®+ ~¯
= ¢l(a0ja00; a0) + ¯
¸ Gl(a00)¡Gl(a0) + ¯
which implies that
1
2
¯ > Gl(a0)¡Gk(a0)
¸ Gl(a00)¡Gk(a00) + ¯
> ¡1
2
¯ + ¯
=
1
2
¯;
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 4
By Lemma 4, we can ensure the existence of a symmetric optimal action ~a which
maximizes the residual surplus of organizationRS(an) over the actions of risk neutral
agents an after subtracting ¯xed wages of risk averse agents. In what follows we
take such action ~a and consider the implementation of ai = ~a from all risk neutral
agents i 2 In.
Now we will show that o®ering a ¯xed wage w to every risk averse agent i 2 Ir
becomes incentive e±cient. To this end, it su±ces to show that the ¯xed wage
contract C ´ fw; ai = 0g maximizes the residual surplus of organization which
belongs to all risk neutral agents, given any action pro¯le of risk neutral agents
an 2 ANn . This is because then there exist no other feasible contracts which Pareto
dominate the ¯xed wage contract.
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Formally, we show the following lemma:
Lemma A3. When the ¯xed wage w is large enough, it becomes incentive e±cient.
Proof. We consider the following maximization problem which states that the
expected residual surplus of risk neutral agents is maximized subject to (IC) and
the acceptance constraint ensuring that risk averse agent cannot be worse o® by
switching to a new contract rather than sticking to the ¯xed wage w:
Problem (OP)
max
ar2ANr ;wi(y)
Ey[R(y)jar;an]¡
X
i2Ir
Eyi [w
i(yi)jai]
subject to
Eyi [u(w
i(yi))jai; a¡i]¡Gi(ai) ¸ Eyi [u(wi(yi))ja; a¡i]¡Gi(a) 8 a 6= ai (IC)
Eyi [u(w
i(yi))jai; a¡i]¡Gi(ai) ¸ u(w) (PE)
Here (PE) is the constraint to ensure that risk averse agent i 2 Ir can be better o®
by accepting a contract Ci 6= C.
Then we show that the contract to solve the above problem becomes the ¯xed
wage contract C for any given action pro¯le of risk neutral agents an when w is
large enough. To see this, note that the objective function in the above problem is
bounded above by
Ey[R(y)jar;an]¡
X
i2Ir
Á(Gi(ai) + u(w))
because, by concavity of u and (PE), we have
Ey[wi(y)jai] ¸ Á(Gi(ai) + u(w)):
Now consider the following maximization problem:
max
ar2ANr
Ey[R(y)jar;an]¡
X
i2Ir
Á(Gi(ai) + u(w)):
Then we can verify that ar = 0 solves this maximization problem when
Á(Gi(ai) + u(w))¡ Á(Gi(0) + u(w)) ¸ Ey[R(y)j0;an]¡ Ey[R(y)jar;an]:
In fact we can ¯nd some w so that the above inequality holds because the right hand
side is ¯nite (by ¯niteness of A) but the left hand side goes to +1 as w ! +1:
Á(Gi(ai) + u(w))¡ Á(Gi(0) + u(w))
> Á0(Gi(0) + u(w))(Gi(ai)¡Gi(0))
! +1 as w ! +1
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due to the convexity of Á and limw!+1 Á0(w) = +1. Thus, when w is large enough,
the optimal contract which solves Problem (OP) becomes the ¯xed wage w for all
risk averse agents. Q.E.D.
Next we consider the incentives of risk neutral agents. We take the risk neutral
agent r 2 In whose action cost is the largest among all risk neutral agents, i.e.,
r 2 argmax
i2In
Gi(~a):
We will de¯ne the wage scheme of the residual claimant later.
For the wage schemes of all other risk neutral agents than the residual claimant
r, we will apply the following lemma.
Lemma A4. Suppose that Assumption 8 is satis¯ed. Then there exists a non-
decreasing individualistic wage scheme ~w(yl) for each risk neutral agent l 2 In with
l 6= r such that it implements the optimal action ~a:
Eyl [ ~w(y
l)j~a]¡Gl(~a) ¸ Eyl [ ~w(yl)ja]¡Gl(a) + ±
for all a 6= ~a where ± is given in (6) in the main text.
Proof. The implementation problem above is reduced to ¯nd a L ¡ 1 dimensional
vector (¢wn)L¡1n=1 such thatX
n
(1¡ F ln(~a))¢wn ¡Gl(~a) ¸
X
n
(1¡ Fn(a))¢wn ¡Gl(a) + ±; 8 a 6= ~a:
and
¢wn ¸ 0; n = 1; 2; :::; L¡ 1:
The last condition is monotonicity requirement (MON) that the wage schedule wn
must be non-decreasing. By Avis and Kaluzny (Theorem 2, 2004), such non-negative
vector (¢wn) exists under Assumption 8. Q.E.D.
By Lemma A4, we obtain
Ez[ ~w(z)j~a]¡ Ez[ ~w(z)ja] ¸ Gl(~a)¡Gl(a) + ±
¸ Gi(~a)¡Gi(a):
for all i 2 In with i 6= n. Thus every risk neutral agent i 2 In other than the residual
claimant r chooses the same optimal action ~a under the same scheme ~w.
De¯ne w^(yi) ´ ~w(yi) + f for i 2 In, i 6= r, where f will be speci¯ed below, and
o®er such scheme to all i 6= r, i 2 In. Then it is clear that every risk neutral agent
i 6= r, i 2 In, does not envy other risk neutral agent j 6= i; r, j 2 In.
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The wage scheme for residual claimant r is given by
wr(yr; y¡r) ´ R(yr; y¡r)¡Nrw ¡
X
i2In
w^(yi) + w^(yr):
Since w^(yi) depends only on his performance yi for each risk neutral agent i except
the residual claimant r, the wage scheme of residual claimant wr(yr; y¡r) depends
on his performance yr only through R(yr; y¡r). Since R is monotone increasing in
yr, wr does so. Thus (MON) is satis¯ed for the residual claimant r as well.
We also de¯ne the ¯xed wage which is o®ered to risk averse agent:
w =
1
N
fE[R(y)j0; ~a]¡NnGr(~a)g:
Given such w, we set f to satisfy
E[ ~w(z)j~a] + f = Gr(~a) + w:
Then, given such (w; f), we can show that
Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)
= Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)(Ez[ ~w(z)j~a] + f)¡Gr(~a)
= Ez[ ~w(z)j~a] + f ¡Gr(~a)
= w:
Then we show the following series of lemmas:
Lemma A5. The residual claimant r does not envy other agents.
Proof. By using the wage schemes de¯ned above, we can verify that the residual
claimant r does not envy other risk neutral agent i 6= r, i 2 In, because
max
ar2A
Ey[R(y)j0; (ar; ~a¡r)]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)E[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(ar)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)
= Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)
= Ez[ ~w(z)j~a] + f ¡Gr(~a)
¸ Ez[ ~w(z)ja]¡Gr(a) + f
= Ez[w^(z)ja]¡Gr(a) 8 a 2 A
Also the residual claimant r does not envy any risk averse agent j 2 Ir because
max
ar2A
Ey[R(y)j0; ar; ~a¡r]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)E[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(ar)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)
= w
¸ w ¡Gr(a):
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Q.E.D.
Lemma A6. Each risk neutral agent other than the residual claimant r does not
envy other agents.
Proof. First we show that any other risk neutral agent i 2 In than the residual
claimant r does not envy any risk averse agent. This is because
Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a) ¸ Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)
= w
¸ w ¡Gi(a)
for all a 6= ~a, where Gi(~a) · Gr(~a) for all i 6= r.
We also show that every risk neutral agent i 2 In, i 6= r, does not envy the
residual claimant r because the expected payo® of agent i 6= r would be the following
if he were o®ered the wage scheme of agent r (i.e., he were residual claimant):
Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i]¡Nrw ¡
X
j2In;j 6=i
Eyj [w^(y
j)j~a]¡Gi(ai)
where agent i was supposed to choose ai. Since agent i obtains Eyi [w^(yi)j~a]¡Gi(~a)
under his own contract, he prefers his own contract w^ to the one o®ered to the
residual claimant r if
Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i]¡Nrw ¡
X
j2In;j 6=i
Eyi [w^(y
j)j~a]¡Gi(ai)
where the right hand side cannot be greater than
Ey[R(y)j0; ~a; ~a¡i]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)
by de¯nition of ~a (which maximizes Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i] ¡ Gi(a) over a 2 A). Thus
it su±ces to show that
Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)
¸ Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)
which is equivalent to
Ez[w^(z)j~a] ¸ Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]:
This holds as equality due to the de¯nitions of w^(z) = ~w(z) + f and w.
Finally, it is clear that any risk neutral agent j 6= r does not envy other risk
neutral agent k 6= r because they are o®ered the same wage scheme. Q.E.D.
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Lemma A7. Each risk averse agent i 2 Ir does not envy other agents when ± is
small enough and F is large enough.
Proof. First we show that every risk averse agent does not envy any other risk
neutral agent j 2 In than the residual claimant r when ± is small and w is large
enough. To see this, we de¯ne ´i for each i 2 I, which satis¯es
E[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)¡ w = ´i:
Note here that ´r = 0 and ´i ! 0 as ± ! 0. Take any risk averse agent i 2 Ir. Then
we can show that when ± > 0 is su±ciently small and the ¯xed wage w can be large
enough, we have
u(w)¡ u(Ez[w^(z)ja])
¸ u0(w)fw ¡ Ez[w^(z)ja]g
= u0(w)fEz[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a)¡ ´i ¡ Ez[w^(z)ja]g
¸ u0(w)f¡Gi(a)¡ ´ig
¸ ¡Gi(a)¡ ´i
where the ¯rst inequality follows from concavity of u, the second inequality from
the fact that Ez[w^(z)j~a] ¡ Gi(~a) ¸ Ez[w^(z)ja] ¡ Gi(a) for all a 6= ~a, and the third
inequality from the fact that u0(w) · 1 for large enough w (by using u0(+1) = 0)
respectively. Thus we obtain
u(w) ¸ u(E[zw^(z)ja])¡Gi(a)¡ ´i
> Ez[u(w^(z))ja]¡Gi(a)
for all a 2 A when ± is so small that ´i can be close to zero if w becomes large
enough.
Next we show that every risk averse agent i 2 Ir does not envy the residual
claimant r when " is su±ciently small. To see this, note that
u(w)
= u
µ
1
N
fEy[R(y)j0; ~a]¡NnGr(~a)g
¶
= u(Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)):
Then we want to show
u(w) ¸ E
24u
0@R(y)¡Nrw ¡X
j2Ir
w^(yj) + w^(yi)
1A ¯¯¯¯¯ai; a^¡i
35¡Gi(ai) (A8)
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for all ai 2 A. For this, by the Jensen's inequality, it su±ces to show that
u(Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a))
¸ u(Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i]¡Nrw ¡NnEz[w^(z)j~a] + Ez[w^(z)jai])¡Gi(ai)
for all ai 2 A. To show this, note that by de¯nition of w,
w = Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Nrw ¡ (Nn ¡ 1)Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a):
Let
B ´ Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i]¡Nrw ¡NnEz[w^(z)j~a] +Ez[w^(z)jai]:
Then the above inequality (A8) can be written by
u(w) ¸ u(B)¡Gi(ai)
which can be further written by
u(w)¡ [u(B)¡Gi(ai)]
¸ u0(w)(w ¡B) +Gi(ai)
where
w ¡B = Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡ Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i]
+ Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gr(~a)¡ Ez[w^(z)jai]:
Under Assumption 9 Ey[R(y)j0; ~a]¡Ey[R(y)j0; ai; ~a¡i] is independent of F . We
also know that Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Ez[w^(z)ja] = Ez[ ~w(z)j~a]¡Ez[ ~w(z)ja] is independent of
F (because ~w(z) is independent of F ). Thus Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Ez[w^(z)ja] is independent
of F as well. Also the optimal action of risk neutral agents ~a does not vary with F .
Then the above term w¡B is independent of F . We can also show that w increases
in F (because the optimal action ~a is independent of F so that it does not change
with F ). Thus we can ensure that u0(w)! 0 as F ! +1, and hence
u(w)¡ [u(B)¡Gi(ai)] ¸ u0(w)(w ¡B) +Gi(ai)
' Gi(ai)
> 0
for all ai > 0 when F is su±ciently large. Thus, since u is strictly concave and
R(y)¡Nrw¡
P
j 6=r w^(y
j)+w^(yr) is random, we can verify that when F is su±ciently
large,
u(w)
¸ u(B)¡Gi(ai)
> Ey
24u
0@R(y)¡Nrw ¡X
j2In
w^(yj) + w^(yi)
1A ¯¯¯¯¯0; ai; ~a¡i
35¡Gi(ai)
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for all ai 2 A. Thus agent i 2 Ir does not envy the residual claimant r. Q.E.D.
From Lemma A5-A7, we have established the result that any agent does not
envy others under the constructed contract.
Finally, when F is large enough, we can take large f and w so that
Ez[w^(z)j~a]¡Gi(~a) ¸ U i
for all i 2 In but i 6= r. Thus we can satisfy (IR) for all i 2 In. Also, since the
expected payo® of the residual claimant r is same as w, we can also ensure that the
residual claimant r and all risk averse agents i 2 Ir obtain larger payo®s than their
reservation payo®s U i as well when F is su±ciently large (note that w can be large
when F is large).
8.8 Proof of Theorem 6
We will modify the proof of Theorem 2 by replacing (MON) by (LL). The main
modi¯cation of the proof is that we show that Assumption 3 is satis¯ed when we
drop (MON) but impose (LL), if " is su±ciently small given ±.
Take two risk averse agents i and j. Here agent j is more e±cient than i in the
sense that ¢Gi(a^; a) > ¢Gj(a^; a) for all a^ > a (Assumption 5). Recall that these
agents must choose the same action a^ due to Lemma 5, when their heterogeneity is
su±ciently small.
Now suppose that a^ > 0 as in the proof of Theorem 2. Then recall that we have
reached the following conclusion that (IC) of more e±cient risk averse agent j is
slack at a^ > 0 if
¢Gi(a^; a)¡¢Gj(a^; a) +
X
n
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u^in ¡
X
n
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u^jn (A9)
is strictly positive for all a < a^.
From now on we will show that this is actually the case when " is su±ciently
small, given (LL). Since u ¸ u^in ¸ u for all yn 2 Y due to (BB) and (LL), the second
term in (A9) is bounded below from
¡ij(a^) ´
X
yn2Y (a^)
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u¡
X
yn2Y nY (a^)
(P jn(a^)¡ P in(a^))u
where Y (a^) is de¯ned as Y (a^) ´ fyn 2 Y j P jn(a^) ¸ P in(a^)g. Also, the third term in
(A9) is bounded above by
­ij(a) ´
X
yn2Y (a)
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u+
X
yn2Y nY (a)
(P jn(a)¡ P in(a))u:
Thus (A9) is bounded below from
¢Gi(a^; a)¡¢Gj(a^; a) + ¡ij(a^)¡ ­ij(a):
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Here, if we take " to be su±ciently small, both ¡ij(a^) and ­ij(a) become small
enough. Then, since ¢Gi(a^; a) > ¢Gj(a^; a) for i > j by Assumption 5, we can show
that
¢Gi(a^; a)¡¢Gj(a^; a) + ¡ij(a^)¡ ­ij(a) > 0
for all a^ > a when " is su±ciently small, given ±. Thus, when we take " to be
su±ciently small given ±, we can establish the result that (IC) of more e±cient risk
averse agent j is not binding at the action a^ > 0 at fair contract C^j . However, this
is not incentive e±cient as we have argued in the proof of Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
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